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Abstract
Rational and intuitive cognitive styles represent two typical manners of acquiring,
organizing, and processing information. Rational style is data-driven, slow, and detailed.
Intuitive style is feelings-driven, fast, and global. People have a stable preference for one style
over the other and style underlies such processes as decision making (Leonard, Scholl, &
Kowalski, 1999). The present study took the perspective that cognitive style is an individual
difference upon which members of a decision making team may vary and that diversity in
cognitive style is related to team processes and outcomes. Specifically, it was hypothesized that
diversity in cognitive style would increase task and affective conflict, lead to lowered similarity
of teammate’s cognitive representations of task information, but ultimately, improve team
performance over that of less diverse teams. Teammate’s perspective taking ability was
hypothesized as a moderating variable. The hypotheses were tested using three-person teams
who completed a complex decision making task in a laboratory setting. Linear regression and
hierarchical moderated multiple regression were used to test the hypotheses. No support was
found for the hypothesized relationships. One explanation could be that the research context and
task deviated too much from past research to be analogous. Several results supported previous
research findings. Contributions and future research ideas are discussed.
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Cognitive Style Diversity in Decision Making Teams
Organizations frequently use teams for decision making tasks. A common example is a
task force made of individuals drawn together to make decisions about organizational problems
(Sundstrom, DeMeuse, & Futrell, 1990). By definition, a team is two or more individuals
working interdependently toward a common goal (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). Therefore, a
decision making team can be defined as two or more individuals working interdependently with
the goal of making a decision.
There are many reasons why an organization would elect to use teams rather than
individuals to make decisions. Teams may be employed when it is believed that in order to
produce the highest quality solution multiple perspectives on the problem are needed (Guzzo &
Dickson, 1996). Alternatively, one person may not hold all of the requisite knowledge or
expertise to most effectively render a decision for a complex problem (Scholten, van
Knippenberg, Nijstad, & DeDreu, 2007). The adage “two heads are better than one” sums up the
notion that teams of individuals have the capability to make higher quality decisions than
individuals working alone (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996).
Many factors contribute to the success or failure of teams. A simplistic way to understand
the complexity of teams is to think of them in terms of the Input-Process-Output (IPO) model
(Hackman, 1987). This model outlines three interrelated aspects of teams and performance.
Inputs are initially existing aspects of the team. These could be individual team member
characteristics, organizational resources, or the team’s task. Processes are the transformation of
inputs that ultimately produces the team’s outputs. Processes include coordination, conflict, or
the development of team cohesion. Outputs (also called outcomes) are the result of the team’s
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processes and can be the team’s product, such as a final decision in a decision making team, or
other outcomes such as team viability, trust, or satisfaction with the team’s performance.
The present study is focused on a single individual difference input and its effects on
team processes and outcomes. The specific individual difference of interest is cognitive style.
This is relevant to decision making teams because cognitive style is the manner in which
individuals gather and assess information. When applied in a decision context it can be defined
as "…the learned, habitual response pattern exhibited by an individual when confronted with a
decision situation. It is not a personality trait, but a habit-based propensity to react in a certain
way in a specific decision context...” (Scott & Bruce, 1995, p. 820). On a team, each member
will bring to the team his or her own “habit-based propensity.” This will interact with the other
teammate’s cognitive styles and with other input variables to produce team processes. These
processes will then result in a final decision or outcome.
Teammates may enter the decision making scenario with cognitive styles that are similar
or dissimilar to the other team members. The team composition and diversity research suggests
that the extent to which teammates are similar on such individual characteristics will affect team
processes and outcomes. Although team diversity is not a nascent area of study, the research on
cognitive style diversity in teams is sparse and empirical work is almost non-existent. The effects
of cognitive style diversity on teams are unknown. Therefore, the goal of the present study is to
determine how cognitive style diversity affects decision making teams’ processes and outcomes.
Specifically, cognitive style diversity was expected to influence team member conflict,
performance, and the team’s ability to develop cognitive congruence regarding the task. The
present study will contribute to at least two areas of research and will represent an initial attempt
to bridge the two streams empirically. First, it will extend the cognitive style research by going
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beyond the individual level to assess cognitive style at the team level. Second, it will answer
calls in the team diversity literature to move beyond demographic diversity toward cognitive
types of diversity (van Kippenberg & Schippers, 2007), and to move beyond proxy measures of
underlying diversity (such as using nationality as a proxy measure of value differences) toward
more direct measures. The following review will therefore cover the construct and relevant
findings associated with cognitive style and also the literature on team composition/diversity. It
will conclude with hypotheses specific to cognitive diversity effects on decision making teams.
Cognitive Style
In the past few centuries, advances in scientific theory and practice have been able to
show that individuals differ in the way they gather and process information (Robey & Taggart,
1981) and the term “cognitive style” has been used to label such differences. Cognitive style has
received theoretical attention in the education, career, and management literatures (Kozhevnikov,
2007). The construct has been popularized by recent interest in the role of “intuition” in
managerial decision making (Sadler-Smith, 2004) and with the notion that it may be useful as a
selection or placement tool. Research on cognitive style is of value to organizations due to its
conceptual distinction from cognitive ability, the notion that cognitive styles may differ in their
applicability to various problems, and the possibility of creating teams with an optimal mix of
styles for particular organizational needs. The following review will offer a definition of
cognitive style including its dimensions, review relevant measurement techniques, and discuss
literature findings.
Cognitive Style Construct
The cognitive style construct has been of interest to researchers for decades (Robey &
Taggart, 1981). It has been found to influence turnover when a misfit between style and the
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demands of the job are present (Chan, 1996). Differences in cognitive style have been related to
leader-member exchange relationships (Allinson, Armstrong, & Hayes, 2001), team leader
behavior (Armstrong & Priola, 2001), teaching style (Evans, Harkins, & Young, 2008),
entrepreneurship characteristics (Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa, & Whitcanack, 2009), decisiveness
(Hough & ogilvie, 2005), and risk assessment in decision making (Henderson & Nutt, 1980).
It has been described using a several typologies [e.g., Adaptors- Innovators (Kirton,
1976); Convergers, Divergers, Assimilators (Kolb, 1976); Sensing-Feeling, Thinking-Perceiving
(Jung, 1971)] but there is considerable consensus on several points. Most researchers agree that
cognitive style is stable within person and that it refers to how individuals acquire and process
information (Kozhevnikov, 2007). For example, Allinson and Hayes (1996) defined cognitive
style as being a stable characteristic associated with how people process and organize
information. Similarly, Rayner and Riding (1997) defined "…cognitive style as a person's typical
or habitual mode of problem solving, thinking, perceiving and remembering" (p. 6). Ruble and
Cosier (1990) noted, "the term "cognitive styles" has been used in a generic sense to refer to
individual differences in the way people process information to make decisions" (p. 283).
Cognitive style also encompasses information gathering approaches in addition to information
processing (Vance, Groves, Paik, & Kindler, 2007). That is, cognitive style influences the type
of data attended to and preferred. Leonard, Scholl, and Kowalski (1999) suggested that these
cognitive differences also influence judgments and ultimately decision making behavior. The
definition of cognitive style used in the present study represents a synthesis of these ideas.
Cognitive style is defined here as:
Cognitive style is an individual’s typical manner of acquiring, organizing, and
processing information. It is habitual, relatively stable across time and situations,
influences preferences, and underlies behavior including decision making.
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Measurement. In an early review of the measurement techniques used in the cognitive
style literature, Robey and Taggart (1981) identified several methods. They categorized these
methods as being physiological such as electroencephalograms (EEG) and skin conduction tests,
behavioral such as time required to complete a task, eye-movements, and trained observer
ratings of behavior, and self-reported style. Self reported style is one of the most popular
methods for assessing cognitive style because of the inherent difficulties associated with the
other methods. For example, it is cumbersome and expensive to assess a large number of
individuals’ brain waves with an EEG. Similarly cumbersome to administer are timed
assessments or measures that must be sent for proprietary scoring. Thus, many researchers have
attempted to create paper-and-pencil measures with straight-forward scoring systems to assess
cognitive style.
Among the instruments designed or used to measure cognitive style in a self-report
format are: the Linear Nonlinear Thinking Styles Profile (LNTSP; Vance et al., 2007), the
Judgment and Perceptions scales of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (e.g., Hough & ogilvie,
2005; Ruble & Cosier, 1990), Embedded Figures Test, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory, Kolb’s Learning Style Inventory (see Robey & Taggart, 1981), Kirton’s AdaptationInnovation scale (Chan, 1996), Problem Solving Styles Questionnaire (Tepper, Tetrault, Braun,
& Romero, 1993), and in an attempt to integrate previous work and to develop a measure that
could be used in a managerial context, Allinson and Hayes’s (1996) Cognitive Styles Index
(CSI).
Due to the number of measures used to assess cognitive style, several attempts have been
made to uncover the relationships between the measures to determine their construct validity
(Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Tepper et al., 1993; Vance et al., 2007). Some studies have shown that
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the measures correlated in expected ways. For example, linear thinking from the LNTSP was
positively correlated with higher rational thinking scores on the CSI (Vance et al., 2007).
However, other studies have found mixed support for hypothesized relationships (Tepper et al.,
1993). Differences between the measures on such features as context specified in the directions
and response format may be partially responsible for the lack of stronger interrelationships
between measures.
Despite somewhat mixed empirical support, several researchers have argued that overlap
exists in the various conceptualizations of cognitive style and that on the whole, many are
consistent with the dual-brain (left-right hemisphere) concept (Hayes & Allinson, 1994; Ridding
& Cheema, 1991; Sadler-Smith, 1998). This is a general theory of cognition suggesting that the
two hemispheres of the brain (right and left) contribute differently to the way people process
information and that people inherently favor one side over the other. It has typically been
discussed as the idea that people have a tendency toward being right-brained or intuitive versus
left-brained or analytical (Robey & Taggart, 1981). Based on these arguments and on some of
the above findings suggesting overlap in cognitive style measures (Allinson & Hayes, 1996;
Vance et al., 2007), the present study was based on the position that there are two basic cognitive
styles (intuitive and rational), that most people tend to prefer one over the other, and that the
preferred style affects information acquisition and processing.
Intuitive style. Right-brain driven information processing has been referred to as
“intuitive”, “holistic”, and “non-linear.” In general, this style of thinking has been described as
being based on internal feelings, a big-picture approach, low amounts of external data gathering,
and fast, intuition-based decision making. For example, Hough and ogilvie wrote, “Intuitive
processes are fast, associative, and use low-effort heuristics.” (p. 426, 2005). Allinson and Hayes
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(1996) noted that left-brained or intuitive terminology, "…refers to immediate judgment based
on feelings and the adoption of a global perspective" (p. 122). Vance et al. (2007) stated,
“Holistic in nature, intuition is often the result of an automatic and unconscious assessment of
the interrelated parts of a nonlinear system that scans the integrated “big picture” to point to
appropriate decisions and new directions, rather than getting delayed and lost in the detailed
analysis of a huge set of data” (p. 169).
In a study of self-managed work teams, it was found that intuitives, relative to rationals,
were more often selected as the leader by team members. Additionally, the intuitive leaders, as
compared to the rational leaders, initiated more socio-emotionally oriented and task-oriented acts
(Armstrong & Priola, 2001). Intuitives were found to have higher entrepreneurial self-efficacy
for intentions toward entrepreneurship and identifying entrepreneurial opportunities than
rationals (Kickul et al. , 2009). Intuitive style has also been found to predict innovativeness
whereas an analytic style did not (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Furthermore, those with a style
favoring internal information sources and a non-linear processing approach (right-brain) were
more likely to report that they use emotions to facilitate thinking (Groves & Vance, 2009).
Rational style. Left-brained led information processing, on the other hand, has been
called “analytic”, “rational”, and “linear.” In general, it is characterized by a thorough search for
facts and data, deliberate, logical information processing, and a focus on problem details when
decision making. For example, Hough and ogilvie (2005) described “Analytical processes…are
slow, rule-based, and depend on high-effort systematic reasoning” (p. 426). Allison and Hayes
(1996) stated that right-brained, rational thinking "…refers to judgment based on mental
reasoning and a focus on detail" p. 122. Moreover, Vance et al. (2007) defined “linear thinking
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style as a preference for attending to external data and facts, and processing this information
through conscious logic and rational thinking…” (p. 170, italics in original).
In a study of school teachers rational/analytics had a teaching style that focused more on
structure, rules, organization, planning, and rational thought than on individuality, inter-personal,
or social elements (Evans, Harkins, & Young, 2008). Rational thinkers were found to have
higher entrepreneurial self-efficacy for planning, marshalling resources, and implementing
activities than did intuitives (Kickul et al., 2009). Having a rational style was found to predict an
internal locus-of-control (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Rationals were found to prefer work
environments with structure, routine, and logic (Allinson & Hayes, 1996). Furthermore, those
with a style favoring external sources of data and a linear processing approach (left-brained)
reported higher abilities to regulate their emotions than did those with an intuitive style (Groves
& Vance, 2009).
Cognitive Style and Influences on Decision Making
As mentioned above, and in the definition of cognitive style for the present study,
cognitive style influences decision making (Leonard et al., 1999; Ruble & Cosier, 1990).
Because cognitive style affects information gathering, organization, and processing, and
influences perceptions and judgment it affects an individual’s decision making approach. For
example, when attempting to acquire information relevant to making a decision, cognitive style
affects the amount of time spent gathering data, the type of information attended to, and the
amount of information deemed necessary for a full grasp of the issue (Scott & Bruce, 1995;
Vance et al., 2007). Cognitive style will be associated with organizing and processing the
acquired information in a global, holistic way, versus a compartmentalized and detailed way
(Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Hough & ogilvie, 2005; Vance et al., 2007). Cognitive style is also
purported to determine partially the number of alternative solutions generated to solve a problem
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and/or the number of alternative options considered for a decision (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Also,
the speed with which a final solution is adopted has been attributed to cognitive style (see Robey
& Taggart, 1989). Therefore, differences between individuals’ in their cognitive style should also
manifest in the way they make decisions.
Summary. Cognitive style represents an underlying approach to gathering, organizing,
and processing information. Two styles: rational and intuitive are the focus of the present study.
People inherently prefer using one style over the other and this tendency is relatively stable
across situations and over time. Additionally, cognitive style underlies everyday perception and
judgment, and, therefore, it also influences behavior including decision making. The aim of the
present study was to examine the relationships between cognitive style diversity and team
processes and outcomes. Although little empirical research has been conducted in the area of
cognitive style diversity, research has investigated other types of diversity in teams. This body
of literature is helpful in understanding the general effects of various types of diversity on teams
and contributes to a framework for hypothesizing the effects of cognitive style diversity on
decision making teams.
Cognitive Style Diversity in Teams
There is a lengthy history of research investigating the effects of various types of
diversity on work teams (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Webber & Donahue, 2001). Recently
researchers have called for investigations into the effects of cognitive types of diversity in teams
(van Kippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Sadler- Smith (1998) recognized the importance of
considering cognitive style in a team context and stated that little is known about how members
with different cognitive styles will interact. Specifically, elements to consider include how
cognitive style diversity will affect conflict, interpersonal relationships, problem solving
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effectiveness, and the ability to reach a consensus. Some researchers (Hough & ogilvie, 2005)
have suggested that although diversity in cognitive style will lead to interpersonal difficulties, it
will ultimately lead to improved performance. To date, there are few studies investigating the
effects of cognitive style diversity in teams.
Volkema and Gorman (1998) found no clear effects of cognitive style diversity on
decision making teams using the Winter Survival task. In a small sample (three teams) Priola,
Smith, and Armstrong (2004) found relationships between cognitive style diversity and
outcomes. Specifically, the homogenous intuitive team took a "feeling" approach, did not get the
correct solution, but had high cohesiveness. The homogenous rational team took an organized
approach, found the correct solution, and the members were satisfied with the team’s
interactions. Furthermore, the heterogeneous cognitive style team was unsatisfied with its
process, found the correct solution, but some members were displeased with the decision of the
group. Other researchers have similarly suggested that high cognitive style diversity teams would
suffer interpersonally but would outperform homogenous teams. For example, Hough and
ogilvie (2005) stated, “…team member cognitions may interact … to create a balance of
complementary styles resulting in a more robust approach to decision making” (p.443).
The small body of research specifically addressing cognitive style diversity in teams
provides little direction for forming hypotheses in the present study. However, the extensive
literature on team composition/diversity in a more general sense can offer guidance. By
organizing the literature on diversity in teams, it is possible to show how cognitive style diversity
may affect teams in ways similar to other, related types of diversity. Therefore, the next section
will offer a framework for organizing the broad diversity literature and suggest a place within
that framework that cognitive style diversity fits. Then, the findings on analogous types of

11
diversity will be reviewed in an attempt to inform hypotheses regarding cognitive style diversity.
Specific hypotheses regarding conflict, the development of schema congruence, and performance
will be advanced.
Diversity in Teams
The study of diversity’s effects on teams is complex because diversity can be
conceptualized in myriad ways. Furthermore, the expected relationships between diversity and
team processes and outcomes are dependent upon how diversity is conceptualized. For this
reason, researchers have offered typologies to differentiate types of diversity and to facilitate
understanding of how diversity affects teams (Pelled, 1996; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Figure
1 provides a summary of the frameworks that have been advanced for categorizing diversity
variables and the direction of relationships that would be expected between different types of
diversity, conflict, and the development of schema congruence. The purpose of this section is to
categorize cognitive style diversity as a function of established typologies, to review the
literature available for types of diversity which are parallel to cognitive style, and to extrapolate
from those findings, hypotheses for the effects of cognitive style diversity on team conflict and
schema congruence.
Figure 1 shows two primary distinctions between types of diversity. Along the vertical
axis, diversity is conceptualized as being either “surface” or “deep” level (Pelled, 1996). This
typology focuses on the extent to which a diversity variable is readily apparent. Examples of
surface level diversity types are sex, age, and race. Examples of deep level diversity types are
values, knowledge, and personality. The horizontal axis of Figure 1 displays task relevance as a
second distinction between types of diversity. This categorization focuses on the extent to which
the type of diversity under consideration is pertinent to the team’s task. For example, on a
surgical team, expertise diversity is more germane to the task than is diversity of religious
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affiliation. On a military team, tenure diversity may impact the team more than would racial
diversity.
When visibility (surface or deep) and task relevance are crossed, four quadrants are
produced. Where the type of diversity falls on these axes determines the general theory of
diversity that is most applicable. Based on the theoretical perspective that is most applicable,
different effects on processes and outcomes can be expected. Two primary theories of the effects
of diversity on teams are also shown in Figure 1 (denoted with the dotted line). Social
categorization is a theory that suggests people judge others by placing them into various groups
depending on their characteristics. People then evaluate the similarity of others to themselves
based on these groupings (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Social
categorization effects are expected to be strongest when the type of diversity is more “surface” in
nature (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007) likely be relatively irrelevant to the team’s task.
As the type of diversity becomes closer to the lower left quadrant of Figure 1, the
informational/decision-making theory becomes more applicable. In general, this theory states
that types of diversity which are deeper in level and more relevant to the task, create a team with
a greater pool of resources from which to draw when making decisions and solving problems.
The theory argues that for such tasks as decision making, having diversity on deep, task relevant
aspects such as knowledge, education, and perspectives will ultimately lead to higher
performance than teams homogenous on such aspects (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Williams &
O’Reilly, 1998). Cognitive style diversity is applicable to the information/decision-making
perspective of diversity for two reasons. First, it is a deep level difference because people cannot
readily detect the cognitive style of others. Second, it is task relevant because in decision
making, the manner in which an individual typically gathers, organizes, and processes
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information has implications for the decision outcome. Because little empirical research has been
conducted on cognitive style diversity, research on other diversity factors that also fit into the
same categorization as cognitive style (i.e., the informational/decision-making perspective) will
be reviewed. The next section will review the diversity literature relevant to the variables
depicted in Figure 1 and hypotheses are presented.
Conflict. Two types of conflict are presented in Figure 1: affective and task. Types of
diversity that evoke social categorization effects have been consistently posited to produce
conflict that is affective in nature (Pelled, 1996; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Also called
“relationship,” “interpersonal,” and “emotional” conflict, affective conflict reflects frustration
with interpersonal compatibilities, irritation, annoyance, and/or general negative emotions
toward teammates (Jehn, 1997). Empirical research has supported the notion that the types of
diversity that elicit social categorization effects lead to affective conflict (Jehn, Northcraft, and
Neale, 1999; King, Hebl, & Beal, 2009; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). In contrast, the type of
conflict posited to result from diversity relevant to the information/decision-making perspective
is task conflict (Pelled, 1996). Whereas affective conflict focuses on interpersonal
incompatibilities, task conflict is defined as disagreements with regard to viewpoints, opinions,
and ideas about the task content (Jehn, 1995). Numerous studies have supported the notion that
deep level, task relevant types of diversity result in task conflict. For example, diversity in work
experience, educational background (Zellmer-Bruhn, Maloney, Bhappu, & Salvador, 2008),
informational background (Jehn et al., 1999), and functional background (Pelled et al., 1999)
have all been found to lead to task conflict.
Because cognitive style is task relevant for a decision making team and also deep level, it
should be related to task conflict. A decision making team might experience task conflict related
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to how to approach or organize the task information, evaluate the importance of information, or
generate solutions or ideas. Diversity in cognitive style should cause members of the team to
attempt to approach the task in different ways. For example, an intuitive team member might
disagree with a rational member’s desire to evaluate thoroughly each piece of information when
the intuitive member feels the solution is already clear. Likewise, a rational member might be
skeptical of an intuitive member relying on his or her hunches and feelings regarding the task.
Therefore, we would expect increased cognitive style diversity to be associated with increased
conflict about how to approach the task.
H1a: There will be a positive linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and task
conflict.
Although the diversity literature points to cognitive style diversity being primarily related
to task conflict, distinctions between the two facets of conflict are not always clear. In many
cases researchers have found that task and affective conflict are related. For example, Jehn et al.
(1999) found that value diversity was related to both task and affective conflict. In a study by
Pelled et al. (1999), although functional background diversity predicted task conflict and the
demographic diversity variables (race and tenure) predicted affective conflict, there was a
significant positive relationship between the two types of conflict. Therefore, although the two
types can be statistically separated (e.g., with confirmatory factor analysis) there does appear to
be a considerable interrelationship between them. To illustrate, a recent meta-analysis found an
overall correlation of .54 between task and affective conflict in teams (De Drue & Weingart,
2003). It is suspected that the reciprocal relationship between conflict types is due to members’
inability to separate mentally criticisms of ideas and approaches (task conflict) from personal
criticisms (affective conflict). As teammates disagree about how to approach the task, these
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incompatibilities may bleed into interpersonal feelings. In summary, although surface level, task
irrelevant types of diversity primarily cause affective conflict and deep level, task relevant types
of diversity primarily cause task conflict, the two types have consistently been shown to be
positively related. Due to the high correlations found between task and affective conflict, it is
also hypothesized that increased cognitive style diversity will be associated with increased
affective conflict.
H1b: There will be a positive linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and affective
conflict.
Development of schema congruence. Figure 1 shows that as the type of diversity
becomes closer to the lower left quadrant, teams are expected to have greater difficulty
developing schema congruence. Schemas are mental representations of information and ideas.
Similarity or congruence can be said to exist among team members when there is substantial
overlap in the content and organization of these mental representations (Rentsch & Hall, 1994).
It has been suggested that types of diversity which apply to the informational/decision-making
perspective impede team members’ ability to develop congruence in the way they understand the
task and task information. Clark, Anand, and Roberson (2000) stated, “…the same diversity that
enriches the availability of multiple viewpoints may create difficulties in arriving at shared
meanings” (p. 212). Cronin and Weingart (2007) suggested that diversity in such factors as
knowledge, values, or norms, cause team members to hold differing views of how to approach
the same problem. Due to such differences, team members may attend to and encode different
aspects or pieces of information regarding the problem. Empirical research has supported these
notions. Deep level, task relevant diversity variables such as diversity in educational background
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(Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001) and mental ability (Edwards, Day, Arthur, & Bell, 2006) have been
found to be related to lower schema congruence.
In general, the information/decision-making perspective on diversity suggests that
differences in deep level, task relevant variables will ultimately be positive for the team’s
performance by bringing a variety of unique perspectives to the decision. However, it appears
that these differences in perspective also cause difficulty communicating and integrating
information to solve problems (Millikan & Martins, 1996). Communicating about unique
perspectives and combining information into new ideas are some of the types of team processes
which have been shown to lead to higher schema congruence (Mello, Rentsch, Delise,
Staniewicz, & Letsky, 2009). Research and theory has substantiated the notion that types of
diversity relevant to the informational/decision-making perspective have these effects on these
types of team processes. For example, Dose and Klimoski’s (1999) work on value diversity
suggested teams with differing values will have more difficulty reaching consensus due to
decreased desire to incorporate other’s information and views into their own interpretation of the
decision. Gebert, Boerner, and Kearney (2006) suggested functional diversity will impede team
members from engaging in “synergistic communication”, defined as the extent to which
members’ diverging positions are specified and recombined into new solutions, due to decreased
ability and desire to share ideas. Empirical results follow from these theories. For example,
differences in knowledge and experience created difficulty between team members in
communication and understanding each other, and was found to relate to low amounts of
information sharing within the team (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Educational background
diversity had a negative linear relationship with the team’s ability to integrate task information
(Dahlin, Weingart, & Hinds, 2005). In summary, when teams are diverse with respect to deep
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level, task relevant variables such as knowledge, values, or cognitive style, their ability to
perform such processes as sharing and integrating task information is impeded, which ultimately
increases the difficulty for members to develop similar schemas.
Cognitive style diversity would be expected to interfere with members’ ability to develop
similar schemas for several reasons. When people differ in the way they assess, organize, and
process information, they will differ in their overall interpretation of that information. They may
differ in what they see as important or relevant, and how they cognitively categorize the
information. This will create difficulty in communicating about the task and inhibit team
members’ ability to relate similarly to the information and task. The present study addressed
cognitive style diversity effects on task schema congruence. Therefore, the focus was on
similarity between team members’ schemas about the task information.
H2: There will be a negative linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and the
development of task schema congruence.
Performance. The primary tenant of the informational/decision-making perspective on
diversity is that diverse teams are expected to increase performance over that of homogenous
teams because the overall pool of resources is greater (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Williams &
O’Reilly, 1998). On a decision making team, diversity on deep level, task relevant variables
should produce a team with various viewpoints, perspectives, and approaches to the decision.
This should create a scenario where the team takes a robust approach to the task and ultimately
has better performance outcomes than would a homogenous team. Research on other deep level,
task relevant diversity factors have been shown to improve certain performance metrics (Pelled,
1996). For example, Jehn et al. (1999) found that when tasks were complex, such as decision
making tasks, informational diversity predicted performance. Rodriguez (1998) found that when
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teams were charged with a task requiring them to identify, evaluate, and implement a solution to
organizational issues, value diversity predicted the performance metrics of creativity and
effectiveness. Additionally, personality diversity in teams has been found to predict customer
satisfaction and task completion (Neuman, Wagner & Christiansen, 1999). Results of the
Neuman et al. (1999) study supported the complementary model of diversity. This viewpoint
suggests that differences between members fit together such that the full spectrum of the
diversity variable is realized on the team. In short, “… each member adds unique attributes that
are necessary for the team to be successful” (Neuman et al., 1999, p. 31).
Cognitive style diversity will increase overall differences in approaches to the task. This
should create a larger pool of ideas and perspectives and ultimately lead to improved
performance over that of homogenous teams. Conversely, homogenous teams might be expected
to lack enough differences in approach to have a well-rounded set of perspectives on the
decision. For example, a homogenous intuitive team might quickly agree on a course of action,
but fail to consider fully all the available information. In contrast, a homogenous rational team
might become so caught up in the details of the information that they become stagnant in
generating new ideas, or fail to see the larger picture. It is in this way that having diversity in
cognitive style will create a complement of opinions on how to perform the task, allowing for a
more robust approach to the decision and ultimately, better performance (Hough & ogilvie,
2005).
H3: Cognitive style diversity will have a positive linear relationship with performance.
Perspective Taking as a Moderator
In an attempt to capture aspects of team dynamics beyond those influenced by cognitive
style diversity, an additional variable was proposed as a moderator. Perspective taking has been
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identified as an individual difference variable that can affect decision making teams (Kemp &
Smith, 1994; Falk & Johnson,1977; Johnson, 1977). It has been found to influence information
exchange, understanding of others’ information, and conflict type. Next, perspective taking is
defined, relevant empirical findings are reviewed, and hypotheses for moderated relationships
are presented.
Perspective Taking.
“Perspective taking may be defined as the cognitive process of putting oneself in the
place of another and understanding how the other thinks about a problem” (Falk & Johnson,
1977, p. 64). Often studied in the negotiation literature, higher self-reported perspective taking
has been linked to decisions that are more beneficial to both sides than deals brokered between
individuals with lower perspective taking (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, &White, 2008; Kemp &
Smith, 1994). This was found to be true for not only mean dyad-level perspective taking but also
for the perspective taking ability of only one team member in a key role (Galinsky et al., 2008).
Perspective taking has been theorized to relate to non-egocentric behavior that subverts one’s
own desires to those of the greater group (in this case the team) (Davis, 1983). Furthermore, this
ability should lead to “smoother and more rewarding interpersonal relationships” (p. 115).
Perspective taking has also been studied with respect to conflict style and type of conflict
(e.g., Falk & Johnson, 1977). In a study of conflict style with close friends and family, Rizkalla,
Wertheim, and Hodgson (2008) found that the ability to take another’s perspective was
associated with positive styles of conflict. Specifically, high perspective takers, more often than
low perspective takers, elected to use conflict styles that focused on finding mutually satisfying
solutions rather than focusing solely on their own interests.
Perspective taking and conflict has also been studied in work teams. Higher mean teamlevel perspective taking in nursing teams was related to perceptions of conflict as task-oriented
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rather than as relationship-oriented (Sessa, 1996). Thus, perspective taking may alter the
relationships between cognitive style diversity and task and affective conflict. Taken together,
this evidence suggests that the willingness and ability to take another team member’s perspective
on the problem might heighten the benefits of task conflict while minimizing the damage that
may be caused by affective conflict.
Task and affective conflict have different effects on team outcomes. When a team is
engaged in a non-routine task, task conflict has been suggested to have a positive effect on team
performance and affective conflict, a negative effect (De Dreu & West, 2001). These
relationships have been found to hold true for decision making tasks (De Drue & Weingart,
2003). Because perspective taking has been shown to alter conflict styles (Rizkalla et al., 2008),
it would be expected to enhance conflict that is beneficial to team outcomes (task conflict) and
decrease conflict which may be detrimental to team outcomes (affective conflict). Specifically,
the ability to see the task from others’ perspectives should increase discussions of various
viewpoints and reasons behind differences of opinion, and generally assist members in exposing
their task-related conflicts. At the same time, perspective taking should allow members to
perceive disagreements as purely task-oriented and not as interpersonal attacks (Sessa, 1996).
Thus, perspective taking should increase the positive effect of cognitive style diversity on task
conflict and decrease the positive effect of cognitive style diversity on affective conflict.
H4a: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity
and task conflict such that the positive relationship will be stronger under conditions of high
perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.
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H4b: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity
and affective conflict such that the positive relationship will be weaker under conditions of high
perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.
Perspective taking has also been found to influence information exchange and
understanding of others’ information. For example, perspective taking was found to increase
performance in negotiation tasks where full disclosure of information was crucial to achieving
high joint profits (Kemp & Smith, 1994). Falk and Johnson (1977) found that higher proportions
of perspective taking behaviors in groups led to higher quality interactions about task
information and increased cooperation between members. Similarly, Johnson (1977) found that
teams instructed in perspective taking created higher quality problem solutions and viewed more
favorably their teams’ information exchange than did teams using other interaction styles.
Furthermore, Johnson found that people in the perspective taking condition perceived their team
as more helpful in presenting information, as more accurately understanding their information,
and as valuing their information and views more than did members of other conditions. Finally,
perspective taking behaviors such as inquiring about the reasoning for others’ preferences,
accepting others’ viewpoints as legitimate, and incorporating others’ perspectives into one’s own
interpretation have been found to increase cognitive congruence in diverse perspective teams
(Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001). Because it has been shown to influence understanding of
another’s information and ideas, perspective taking would be expected to reduce the negative
effect of cognitive style diversity on the development of task schema congruence.
H4c: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity
and task schema congruence such that the negative relationship will be weaker under conditions
of high perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.
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Method1
Participants
The sample consisted of 126 University of Tennessee psychology undergraduate students
assigned to 42 three-person teams. One team was unable to complete the task due to equipment
malfunction. These participants were included in analyses of individual-level variables but were
excluded from analyses of team-level variables. The sample was 48.4% female, 79.4% Caucasian,
with an average age of 19.3 years, and 94.4% were born in the United States. Eighty-five percent
were lower classman (freshman or sophomore). Twenty-nine percent reported holding a job at the
time of their participation. All of those who reported holding a job worked less than full-time and
75% reported their job was one of convenience rather than career-oriented. Participants were
recruited using the online Human Participants in Research (HPR) system. This system allows
students to view a description of current studies being conducted at the University of Tennessee and
to sign up to participate in the study of their choice. Participants received $20 and course credit for
participating.

Task
The task was a simulated military non-combatant rescue mission which required teams to
plan the evacuation of stranded civilians from a combat area. The task was developed with the use of
Navy SEALs and the materials included an optimal rescue plan (Biron, Burkman, & Warner, 2008).
Each team member received general background information (e.g., number of available troops) that
was held in common by all members. Additionally, members were randomly assigned unique rolespecific information regarding weapons (e.g., artillery specifications), intelligence (e.g., U.S. military
locations), or environment (e.g., tide levels, fauna). Each team member’s unique information was
only meaningful in relation to the other members’ unique information and to the general information.
Therefore, the optimal plan could be achieved only if members shared and integrated common and
1

Portions of the following section were adapted from Rentsch, Delise, Salas, and Letsky (2010).
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unique information. Teams were allowed one hour for virtual discussion of the task including
designing and recording their rescue plan (Biron et al., 2008).

Measures
Cognitive style. In order to determine the most appropriate measure of cognitive style for
use in the present study, a pilot study was conducted to examine several measures (Mello, Scott,
Delise, Staniewicz, & Rentsch, 2011). A literature search revealed a number of measures purported
to assess cognitive style or similarly labeled constructs. The measures varied in their intended
audience, context, and response formats. The purpose of the pilot study was to uncover relationships
between the measures, to estimate the psychometric properties of each measure, and to establish
discriminant and convergent validity evidence. An additional goal was to determine the extent to
which the measures elicited a social desirability bias. Four self-report style measures were selected.
The measures were expected to converge with one another on dimensions of rational and intuitive
style and also to converge with several dimensions of personality, goal orientation, and selfmonitoring. Discriminant variables included the remaining personality dimensions, perspective
taking, self-esteem, collectivism, and social desirability. Appendix A contains information on the
sample, method, and results of the study.
Based on the findings of the pilot study, in the present study cognitive style was assessed
with the Cognitive Style Index (CSI, Allinson & Hayes, 1996). The measure contained 38
true/uncertain/false questions. Twenty-two items were worded such that a true response indicated a
preference for rational style and 16 items were worded such that a true response indicated a
preference for intuitive style (i.e., were reverse scored). Two points were given to rational responses,
0 points to intuitive responses, and 1 point to uncertain responses. Therefore, the theoretical
maximum for the scale was 76 and the minimum was 0. In the present sample (n = 126), CSI scores
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ranged from 10 to 74, the mean score was 43.58, and the internal consistency reliability estimate was
.88. See Appendix B for items.

Perspective taking. Perspective taking was assessed using the Perspective Taking subscale
of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983). The Perspective Taking scale, “assesses the
tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others” (pp. 113-114). It
contained seven items rated on a 1 (does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me very well) scale. In
the present sample (n = 126), perspective taking scores ranged from 2 to 28, the mean score was
17.46, and the internal consistency reliability estimate was .77. See Appendix C for items.

Task conflict. Task conflict was assessed using four items adapted from Jehn’s (1994, 1997)
relationship conflict scale and used in Hinds and Mortensen (2005). Items were rated on a five-point
scale with anchors 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). In the present sample (n = 123), task conflict scores
ranged from 4 to 18, the mean score was 9.17, and the internal consistency reliability estimate was
.80. See Appendix D for items.

Affective conflict. Affective conflict was assessed using six items adapted from Jehn’s
(1994, 1997) relationship conflict scale and used by Hinds and Mortensen (2005). Items are rated on
a five-point scale with anchors 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). In the present sample (n = 123),
affective conflict scores ranged from 6 to 27, the mean score was 7.93, and the internal consistency
reliability estimate was .86. See Appendix D for items.

Task schema congruence. Task schema congruence was assessed using the Adaptive
Structured Knowledge Assessment (Rentsch, 2006). The ASK Assessment was developed to ensure
the content of the task schema measure was relevant to each particular team. There were two main
steps to the ASK Assessment: a recall procedure and a sorting with paired comparison procedure.
The recall, sorting, and paired comparison procedure is consistent with previous work assessing the
congruence of team member’s cognitive representations of task information (see Rentsch et al.,
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2010). Members completed all parts of the ASK Assessment individually. First, following the team’s
planning session team members were allowed 10 minutes to freely recall any of the information
discussed during the interactions. They listed discrete pieces of information as words, phrases, or
sentences (e.g., “SEALS teams are a Navy asset”; “Sunrise and sunset times”). These items
contained pieces of a member’s own unique information, another member’s unique information,
general information, or new ideas. Next, team members were allowed 3 minutes to review their list of
information and to select the top 10 pieces of information that they felt were most important to the
team for planning the mission. This procedure was designed to ensure that the content used for the
remainder of the ASK Assessment was information the team actually used while planning their
mission. Because teams were free to discuss any information during their planning time, discussions,
rescue plans, and recalled information were unique to each team. Therefore, teams were likely to
develop schema congruence regarding the task based on their team’s own unique discussion. To
assess the schema congruence of all teams using the same task stimuli would yield a measure with
content that is potentially irrelevant to some teams. That is why the ASK Assessment requires that
each team generate its own content for the task schema congruence measure (Rentsch, 2006).
For each team, the 10 most important items each team member generated in step one (the free
recall) were pooled to create a set of 30 items. Each information item was presented on electronic
“cards” so that all team members had the same set of 30 cards on their computer screen. Still working
independently, each team member sorted his/her information cards into “stacks” or categories of
information represented by separate boxes on the screen. They were instructed to sort the information
into categories according to the similarity of the information on each card. For example, a participant
might have chosen to place information about helicopters into one category, and information about
the stranded civilians into another category, etc. Participants then generated a label for each category.
After creating these categories and labels, each team member independently rated the degree of
similarity among each of the category labels using a paired comparison process. The computer
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program presented the category labels in pairs until all possible pairs were presented. Team members
rated the similarity of the information in the categories by selecting a number from an 11-point scale
which ranged from -5 (very dissimilar) to +5 (very similar). The number assigned to each category
pair was extrapolated to all cards contained within that category. Cards in the same category were
assigned the highest rating of similarity. Therefore, for each team member, a 30 x 30 matrix was
established that contained his or her similarity ratings of the team’s 30 information cards. For each
team, the three team members’ similarity matrices were submitted to an individual difference
multidimensional scaling analysis. This procedure is based on Euclidian distances and evaluated

the distances between data points (pieces of information) for each team member’s matrix. It
produced a measure of goodness of fit in the form of a R2. R2 represents the variance accounted
for in the given data. A higher R2 corresponds to greater similarity in the teammate’s ratings, and
was used as the index of task schema congruence. This method is consistent with past research
(e.g., Rentsch, 1990; Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001). In the present sample (n = 40), R2 values
ranged from .43 to .99.
Team performance. Team performance was evaluated based on the written final plan
submitted by the team. A scoring system was used to evaluate several aspects of the quality of the
team’s plan. High performance was evidenced by a plan that met requirements outlined in the team’s
mission (e.g., rescue must be completed within 24 hours; forces are to avoid contact with the enemy),
took into account vital elements of the information, integrated crucial pieces of information from
various roles to reach proper conclusions, and met criteria for feasibility and efficiency. A
standardized list of the most important aspects a team must consider, areas where connections
between information existed, and particularly positive or negative actions a team could have taken
were used to evaluate the final plans. Points were awarded or deducted for each item on the list. Four
graduate students very familiar with the task assisted in refining the coding system. Seven final plans
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were each coded by two such independent raters. Each rater provided feedback and suggestions that
were compiled into a set of scoring rules. Next, 10% of the final plans were coded by two
independent raters using the scoring rules. The raters resolved discrepancies in their scoring by
achieving consensus, which is consistent with Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, Milanovich, and Reynolds’s
(2001) rating methods. Simple interrater agreement was 95%. Krippendorf’s alpha was .92 (Hayes &

Krippendorf, 2007). Acceptable alphas are .667 or above (Krippendorff, 2004). Given the high
levels of agreement on the scoring system, the remaining final plans were scored by only one rater.
Three performance measures were calculated to capture different aspects of performance.
The first metric represented the proportion of positive to negative decisions made in the rescue plan.
This was calculated as the percentage of points awarded (for correct or positive actions) to points
deducted (for incorrect or negative actions) which produced a percentage “good” score for each
teams’ plan. Percentage “good” scores ranged from 38% to 94%. The second measure was based on
an optimal plan produce by Navy SEALS (Biron et al., 2008). Each team’s plan was compared to the
optimal plan and points were awarded or deducted based on similarity. “Optimal” plan scores ranged
from -8 to 13 points. The final measure of performance was a completeness score. There were twelve
portions of the plan teams were required to complete (e.g., “What mode(s) of transportation will the
SEALS use to get to the island?”; “What time will they leave the island?”). Teams were awarded 1
point for completing each part of the final plan sheet and scores ranged from 2 to 12 points.

Procedure
The proposed study was part of a larger study. Participants signed up for the study via the
online system described above. Data was collected from participants in two phases. In the first phase,
participants were provided a link to an online survey which contained the CSI, perspective taking,
and demographic items. Participants were required to complete these measures at least 48 hours
before participating in the remainder of the study. This was done to prevent participants from altering
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their behavior during the second phase because of nature of the items presented in the first phase.
After completing the online measures, participants were assigned a time to come to the laboratory to
complete the team portion. Data from the surveys was linked to the laboratory participants using an
alphanumeric code. Two participants completed the surveys in Phase 1 twice. For these participants,
their two sets of survey responses were averaged.
In the second phase, participants came to the laboratory to complete the rescue mission
planning with two other participants (creating a three-person team). Upon entering the laboratory,
participants granted their informed consent and were assigned to a team and role. Then, teams
received a task overview. Teams were given training on how to use the communication software on
their individual computers. This software allowed the three members of the team to chat about the
task (share information, develop ideas, etc.) during their mission planning time. Next, team members
reviewed the information packets independently for 35 minutes. After a short break, members were
reassembled and read a short statement regarding their role’s expertise aloud to their teammates. The
experimenter then explained the final plan sheet that the team needed to complete with the details of
their rescue plan. Team members were escorted to their individual workstation (computer and desk)
that were connected virtually with their teammates’ computers. Teams were allowed 60 minutes to
chat electronically with their teammates about the task and to complete the teams’ written final plan
sheet. Following the task, teammates were allowed 2 minutes to review the official plan submitted by
the selected member. Then, teammates completed the first step of the ASK Assessment by recalling
and selecting the top 10 pieces of information from the team’s discussion as described above.
Following a short break, during which they were forbidden from speaking, members independently
completed the remainder of the ASK Assessment by sorting (categorizing), labeling, and rating the
similarity of information generated in the first step. After completion of the ASK Assessment,
participants completed the affective and task conflict scales. Then participants were debriefed and
paid for their participation.
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Results
Preliminary Scale Analyses
Internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) estimates for the CSI, perspective
taking, task conflict, and affective conflict are reported above and each estimate reached
acceptable levels.
In order to determine if the self-report and perceptual variables were distinct constructs,
factor analysis was conducted with the items from the cognitive style, perspective taking, task
conflict, and affective conflict scales at the individual level. A confirmatory factor analysis with
maximum likelihood estimation was used. The approach was to construct and compare two
models: a null model and a four-factor model. The null model was used to test the assumption
that a single factor (i.e., self-report method) underlay the data and all indicators (survey items)
were fully free to inter-correlate. The second model was a four-factor model and was based on
the assumption that the indicators (survey items) are associated with the four constructs,
cognitive style, perspective taking, task conflict, and affective conflict. Because affective and
task conflict were expected (and have been shown, Jehn et al., 1999) to be interrelated, these two
were allowed to correlate in the specified model. They were specified to be uncorrelated with
cognitive style and perspective taking, which were specified to be uncorrelated with each other.
In order to show that the data represent four distinct constructs, the fit of the null model and fourfactor model were compared. Evidence in favor of the four-factor model would show that, a) the
four-factor model was good fit to the data and, b) the four-factor model was better fit to the data
than the null model. Two fit indices, chi-square and the root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA), were used to compare the models. Chi-squared is an assessment of overall model fit
and tests if deviations in the observed fit from the proposed fit could be explained by random
chance. Both the null model and the four-factor model showed χ2 probability levels < .001
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suggesting that the deviations in observed fit compared to proposed fit were not due to chance.
Chi-squared, although a useful statistic for initial summaries of model fit, has known problems
such as over-sensitivity to sample size (Byrne, 2001; Loehlin, 2004). It is not uncommon for the
χ2 to suggest poor model fit while other fit indices suggest adequate or good model fit. For this
reason, the second test of fit was the RMSEA. RMSEA takes into account sample size, model
degrees of freedom, and the chi-square and essentially estimates how well the model can account
for variation in the population rather than in the given sample. RMSEA values of < .10 are
considered acceptable fit and < .05, excellent fit (Loehlin, 2004). In order to show that the
measures are distinct the four-factor model needed to be a good fit to the data and also a better fit
than the one-factor model. The four factor model had a RMSEA value of .06 showing that it was
a good fit to the data. The RMSEA value of the one factor (null) model also showed an
acceptable value of .09. However, the four factor model was a better fit to the sample data.
Therefore, the remainder of analyses will consider cognitive style, perspective taking, and task
and affective conflict to be separate constructs.
Aggregation to Team Level
Cognitive style. Separation diversity is indicated for a variable when observations fall
along a continuum. “Such differences reflect … horizontal distance along a single continuum
representing dissimilarity in a particular attitude or value, for example” (Harrison & Klein, 2007,
p. 1200). For the present study, three basic assumptions about separation diversity are that, a)
members within team differ with respect to the variable (cognitive style), b) teams differ from
one another in how dispersed members are along the variable continuum (in some teams,
members will have scores that are close together whereas in other teams, members’ scores will
vary widely), and c) differences between degree of dispersion are systematically related to other
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variables (e.g., performance) (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Separation diversity is appropriately
indexed by calculating absolute distances of individuals’ scores from the teams’ mean.
In the present study, cognitive diversity was assessed as separation diversity. Because
the cognitive style measure (CSI) produces interval-level data, team cognitive style diversity was
indexed with the within-team standard deviation. Cognitive style diversity in the present sample
(n = 42) ranged from 1.53 to 30.45 with an average value of 11.04. In addition to calculating
each team’s cognitive style diversity, each team’s mean cognitive style was also calculated and
used in preliminary analyses described below. Mean cognitive style (n = 42) ranges from 24.67
to 56.67 with an average value of 43.57.
Task conflict. In order to justify aggregation of the task conflict scale to the team level,
adequate agreement between teammates as to the level of task conflict present in the team must
be established. James, Demaree, and Wolf (1984) advocated the use of the within-group
interrater reliability statistic for multi-item measures: rWG(J). This statistic compares the variance
present in the observed responses to the variance that would be assumed under random
responding. For the present scale a uniform distribution served as the comparison. The expected
variance under a uniform distribution is σEU2 = (A2 -1)/12 where A = the number of alternatives
on the response scale. For the current measure’s five-point likert scale this was calculated as (52 1)/12 or 2. Because task conflict is a four-item measure, Equation 1 will be used for evaluating a
given team’s within team interrater reliability:
(1)
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where s
 = the observed variance for a given team. To the extent that teammates respond

similarly to one another, the value obtained will approach 1.0, or perfect agreement. To the
extent that teammates responded dissimilarly (they did not agree as to the level of task conflict)
the value will be less than 1.0. Sample-level average values above .70 are typically considered
acceptable agreement to aggregate data to the team level (Zellmer-Bruhn et al., 2008). The
average rWG(J) value for task conflict for the present sample was .73. Because there were some
teams that did not have rWG(J) values above .70, tests of hypothesis regarding task conflict were
conducted on the full sample and also a subset of the sample with acceptable agreement levels.
The overall direction, magnitude, and significance of results was the same for both sets of data.
Therefore, the entire sample was used in all tests of hypotheses.
In addition to the rWG(J) statistic, an inter-class correlation coefficient (ICC) served as a
further test to justify aggregation to the team level. ICC(1) is a test of the reliability of individual
ratings compared to the team’s average. This is an appropriate statistic when raters (teammates)
are nested within team and the within-team agreement is of primary interest (James, 1982).
ICC(1) is, in essence, a form of analysis of variance that compares the within-team variability to
the between-team variability. It tests that there is less variability in scores within a team than
between the teams and can be calculated using Equation 2:
(2)
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Where BMS = the between team mean square, WMS = the within team mean square and k = the
number of teammates on a team (Shrous & Fleiss, 1979). Evidence that there is justification to
aggregate within team task conflict scores is shown with a significant F- statistic at the p < .05
level. Additionally, Lebreton and Senter (2008) advocate viewing ICC values similarly to effect
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sizes such that, for example, a value of .05 could be viewed as a small effect, .10 a medium
effect, and .25 a large effect (p. 838). In the present sample, the ICC(1) for task conflict was .15
(p = .057). Although this did not quite reach significance, a value of .15 can be considered a
“moderate” effect. This suggests that membership on a particular team contributed to the
variance in ratings of task conflict on that team. In summary, the sample average rWG(J) was > .70
and the ICC(1) could be interpreted as a moderate effect for group membership.
Affective conflict. Affective conflict scores were subjected to the same rWG(J) and ICC(1)
statistics described above in order to test for adequacy of agreement before aggregating
responses to the team level. The only difference was that affective conflict was a 6-item scale
and thus, J = 6 in Equation 1 above. The average rWG(J) value for affective conflict for the sample
was .87. Because there were some teams that did not have rWG(J) values above .70, tests of
hypothesis regarding task conflict were conducted on the full sample and also a subset of the
sample with acceptable agreement levels. The overall direction, magnitude, and significance of
results was the same for both sets of data. Therefore, the entire sample was used in all tests of
hypotheses. The ICC(1) value for affective conflict was .16 (p = .04) suggesting a moderate and
significant effect of group membership on ratings of affective conflict. The high average rWG(J)
and significant ICC(1) for rating of affective conflict provide acceptable evidence to justify
aggregating to the team level.
Perspective taking. Perspective taking is an individual difference variable and therefore
it is unnecessary to justify aggregation prior to averaging the team’s perspective taking scores.
Because mean team level perspective taking had been shown to predict team level outcomes in
previous research (Galinsky et al., 2008), the average perspective taking score for each team

34
served as the team’s perspective taking in analyses. The team level perspective taking scores (n =
42) ranged from 9 to 24.33 with an average of 17.45.
Tests of Hypotheses
Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations for all study variables are shown in
Table 1. Hypotheses 1a-3 are listed below and were tested with linear regression using the
ordinary least-squares (OLS) model. For all tests of Hypotheses a significance level of p < .05
was be applied.
H1a: There will be a positive linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and task
conflict.
H1b: There will be a positive linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and affective
conflict.
H2: There will be a negative linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and the
development of task schema congruence.
H3: Cognitive style diversity will have a positive linear relationship with performance.
According to Harrison and Klein (2007), when using separation measures of diversity it
is prudent to first assess the mean-level effects before attempting to determine diversity effects.
Therefore, as a preliminary control, tests of Hypotheses 1a-3 first included a test of the mean
effect of cognitive style on the outcome variables task conflict, affective conflict, task schema
congruence, and performance. Table 1 shows that there was a significant relationship between
mean cognitive style and task conflict (r = -.36, p = .01). This was the only outcome variable
related to mean cognitive style. To account for this relationship, the test of Hypothesis 1a was
conducted in a hierarchical fashion with mean cognitive style entered into the regression
equation in Step 1 and cognitive style diversity entered in Step 2. Step 1 showed that mean
cognitive style accounted for 13% of the variance in task conflict (R2 = .13, p = .02). However,
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the inclusion of cognitive style diversity in Step 2 failed to show a significant incremental
improvement in the prediction of task conflict above that already accounted for by mean
cognitive style (∆R2 = .013, p = n.s.). These results are shown in Table 2. Therefore, Hypotheses
1a was not supported.
Because affective conflict was unrelated to mean cognitive style, the test of Hypotheses
1b included only cognitive style diversity. Task conflict was regressed onto cognitive style
diversity. The resulting R2 was not significant (R2 = .00, p = n.s.) therefore, Hypotheses 1b was
not supported. Hypotheses 2 was tested by regressing schema congruence onto cognitive style
diversity. The resulting R2 was not significant (R2 = .00, p = n.s.) therefore, Hypotheses 2 was
not supported. A separate regression was conducted for each of the operationalizations of
performance: percent good, optimal plan, and completeness. The result were not significant (R2 =
.01,.01 .02, respectively, p = n.s.). Taken together, there was no support for Hypotheses 3.
Hypotheses 4a-c are listed below and were tested using moderated hierarchical multiple
regression.
H4a: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity
and task conflict such that the positive relationship will be stronger under conditions of high
perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.
H4b: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity
and affective conflict such that the positive relationship will be weaker under conditions of high
perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.
H4c: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity
and task schema congruence such that the negative relationship will be weaker under conditions
of high perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.
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First, in accordance with Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003) perspective taking was
mean-centered by subtracting the mean value from all observed values. This created a linearly
transformed variable retaining all of its original distributional properties. Next, a series of
regression equations were conducted to test the interaction effect of cognitive style diversity and
perspective taking on the outcome variables (Cohen et al, 2003; Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). In
Step 1 the outcome variable was regressed onto cognitive style diversity and perspective taking
simultaneously. In Step 2 the outcome variable was regressed onto cognitive style diversity,
perspective taking, and the cross product (interaction) of cognitive style diversity and perspective
taking simultaneously. A significant F test for the change in R2 (∆R2) obtained from Step 2
would indicate that the interaction makes a unique contribution to the explanation of variance in
the dependent variable above and beyond the main effects.
To test Hypothesis 4a, task conflict was first regressed onto cognitive style diversity and
perspective taking simultaneously in Step 1. In Step 2, the cross-product of cognitive style
diversity and perspective taking was included in the regression. The result of adding the
interaction produced an increase in R2 (∆R2 = .03); however, this change was not significant.
Therefore, Hypotheses 4a was not supported. Perspective taking did not moderate the
relationship between cognitive style diversity and task conflict. These results are shown in Table
3.
Hypothesis 4b was similarly tested with affective conflict regressed onto cognitive style
diversity and perspective taking in Step 1 of the hierarchical regression. In Step 2 the crossproduct of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking was also included in the regression.
The inclusion of the interaction term in Step 2 increased the explained affective conflict variance
from 1% to 16% and this change was significant (∆R2 = .15, p = .01). These results are shown in

37
Table 4. To aid in interpreting the direction and magnitude of the interaction effect, the simple
slopes of the relationship between cognitive style diversity and affective conflict were plotted
(Cohen, et al., 2003) at high and low levels of perspective taking. Given that there were no
theoretical reasons to posit specific levels of perspective taking, the values of perspective taking
selected were one standard deviation above and below the mean. The regression lines for high
and low perspective taking are shown in Figure 2. Unfortunately, the relationships were counter
to the hypothesized direction and therefore, there was no support for Hypothesis 4b.
To test Hypothesis 4c, schema congruence was regressed onto cognitive style diversity
and perspective taking in Step 1. In Step 2 the cross-product of cognitive style diversity and
perspective taking was also included in the regression. The inclusion of the interaction term
produced an increase in (∆R2 = .05); however, this change was not significant. Therefore,
Hypotheses 4c was not supported. Perspective taking did not moderate the relationship between
cognitive style diversity and schema congruence. These results are shown in Table 5.
Post-Hoc Analyses
The formal hypotheses argued for linear relationships between cognitive style diversity
and the outcome variables. Because no support was found for the linear relationships, one
possible explanation is that the relationships are actually curvilinear. For example, it is possible
that some cognitive style diversity increases performance but that too much cognitive style
diversity hinders performance. For this reason, analyses were conducted to test for curvilinear
relationships between cognitive style diversity and task conflict, affective conflict, schema
congruence, and the three performance scores. First, a new variable was created representing the
quadratic function by squaring cognitive style diversity for each team. Then, hierarchical
regressions were conducted with cognitive style diversity entered in Step 1 and cognitive style
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diversity plus the quadratic function entered in Step 2. No significant curvilinear relationships
were found.
Discussion
This primary purpose of this study was to explore the effects of cognitive style diversity
in decision making teams on conflict, schema congruence, and performance. This represents a
move from the individual level of analysis, which is typical in past research, to the team level,
which has not been examined. A secondary purpose was to examine the moderating effects of
perspective taking on these relationships. Cognitive style is an individual difference defined as
one’s typical manner of gathering, organizing, and processing information. Diversity in team
members’ cognitive styles was expected to create more conflict, decrease the team’s ability to
develop schema congruence, and improve performance. Perspective taking was expected to
decrease affective conflict, increase task conflict, and make developing schema congruence less
difficult. Hypotheses were tested in data obtained from three-person distributed teams collected
in a laboratory study using a high fidelity military task. No support was found for the
hypothesized relationships. The main variable of interest, cognitive style diversity, displayed no
significant relationships with any study variables. Perspective taking, the moderating variable,
also did not demonstrate expected relationships.
There are several possible explanations for the lack of anticipated findings in the present
study. The study was conducted to extend current research by examining the hypothesized
relationships at the team level of analysis and by investigating them within the context of a
complex decision task in a virtual communication environment. There is sound reasoning in
defense of the study context as an advancement over past research contexts. The complex task
used in the present study, which included unique role information and a time constraint, is more
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analogous and therefore more generalizable to that of work teams than previous studies which
used simpler tasks such as the Winter Survival task (Volkema & Gorman, 1998). The virtual
communication medium also closely approximated the trend toward virtual teamwork and
communication in the workplace (e.g., Bosch-Sijtsema, Ruohomäki, & Vartiainen, 2009).
However, the wide deviation of the present context from that of past cognitive style
research may have contributed to the unexpected findings. Past research studied cognitive style
in a correlational manner with other variables such as teaching style (Evan et al., 2008) but no
known studies have investigated cognitive style’s interaction with various decision context
factors such as task type or team context factors such as interdependence. The present task
crossed multiple categories of task types (McGrath, 1984) for groups and teams. It is a
“generating” task requiring planning future actions, a “choosing” task requiring a final decision
that is compared to an optimal answer, and also a form of “cognitive conflict” task where various
viewpoints must be combined. It is possible that the complexity of the task type created difficulty
in parceling out the effects of cognitive style diversity on the other variables. Perhaps cognitive
style diversity has different effects on the various sub-categories of task type. For example,
maybe it increases idea generation but decreases viewpoint integration. It is possible that in
simpler, less complicated research contexts the effects of cognitive style are clearer than in a
more complex and realistic research environment and perhaps these advances in research context
should have been approached more incrementally.
The addition of virtual communication to the task context added another layer of
complexity which may have contributed to the unclear findings. Virtual communication is
different from face-to-face communication in a number ways (Driskall, Radtke, & Salas, 2003).
First, it qualitatively changes information sharing behavior. A recent meta-analysis of virtual
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team communication found that as virtuality increased towards total virtuality (such as in the
present study) teams shared more unique than common information but shared less information
overall (Mesmer-Magnus, DeChurch, Jimenez-Rodriguez, Wildman, & Shuffler, 2011). Some
explanations for these findings included that teams tended not to repeat information or “waste”
time on common information due to the cumbersome nature of typing versus speaking and
because the medium itself leaves a history of past information shared. It might be expected that
changes in information sharing behavior may alter cognitive styles’ relationships with other
variables because cognitive style affects how people search for and process information
(Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Ruble & Cosier, 1990; Vance et al., 2007). In addition to its effects on
information sharing, virtual communication is well-known to inhibit important communication
cues related to expressing and interpreting meaning, feelings, and understanding (Driskall et al.,
2003; Thompson & Coovert, 2003). This is often referred to as “degrading” the quality and
richness of the teams’ communication relative to face-to-face or less virtual (e.g., video
conferencing) environments (Mesmer-Magnus et al., 2011). It is possible that the ability to
perspective take is altered or hindered by virtualness. Although no research to date has explicitly
tested the effects of virtualness on perspective taking ability, related research exists. For
example, Bertacco (2007) found that when participants were expecting e-mail communication
from another person they engaged in less perspective taking than when expecting handwritten
ground mail communication. Therefore, the virtual communication medium used in the present
study may have impacted participants’ ability or willingness to engage in perspective taking
during the task. In summary, the complexity of the task and virtuality of the communication
medium may have overwhelmed team members’ typical decision making and perspective taking
behavior altering expected relationships.
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In the same way that the task context may have contributed to the unexpected findings
with respect to cognitive style diversity, it may have also been a factor in the unanticipated
results for perspective taking. One contribution of the present study was to extend perspective
taking research into different contexts. Therefore, necessarily the present context differed from
past research and the findings may show that this different context is not analogous to past
contexts. Past research on perspective taking has been largely conducted in negotiation situations
where the interest was in whether the parties came to decisions that benefited both sides but not
whether their decisions met external criteria of effectiveness or correctness (Kemp & Smith,
1994). In these scenarios, seeing the other’s perspective led to willingness to create mutual
cooperative outcomes rather than competitive ones. In the context of the present study, the
objective was to create the best solution, not necessarily the solution that incorporated
everyone’s ideas or suggestions. In other studies, perspective taking was manipulated or trained
(Falk & Johnson, 1977; Johnson, 1977; Sessa, 1996) rather than self-reported. In these studies,
the notion of perspective taking and/or benefits of perspective taking was made salient to
participants. In the present study, it was not suggested to participants that they should engage in
perspective taking. In fact, participants took the perspective taking measure days in advance of
performing the task to minimize any priming effect. It is possible that effects for perspective
taking are most prominent when performing perspective taking behaviors is strongly encouraged
through manipulation or training. Therefore, these differences between the present and past
research might explain the unanticipated findings. A final possible explanation is that although
the self-report measure used in the present study (Davis, 1983) has a long history of use in
research, other measures of perspective taking may be more accurate. Recently Park and Raile
(2010) found no relationship between self and other ratings of perspective taking using the Davis
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(1983) measure suggesting that people may not be very accurate judges of their own perspective
taking abilities.
Although the hypothesized relationship were not supported in the present study, notable
and interesting findings did emerge from the study. For example, task and affective conflict were
related in several ways to other study variables. Task conflict was negatively correlated with
mean cognitive style indicating that more rational teams had less task conflict. People with a
rational cognitive style prefer to engage in a detailed, linear decision making process (Vance et
al., 2007). If all members were more rational than intuitive, they may have agreed that a
methodical, linear approach to the task was best and therefore, may have experienced less
conflict about the decision making method. On the other hand, intuitive people jump to
conclusions and rely on their gut-instincts (Hough & ogilvie, 2005). If each intuitive teammate
came into the task discussion with his/her own notions about the best solution, this may have
caused friction and disagreements about how to perform the mission.
Task and affective conflict had several other interesting relationships that would be
expected based on the literature. First, task and affective conflict displayed a significant positive
correlation with each other. This finding is consistent with past research on team conflict which
has shown that although people are capable of mentally separating task and affective conflict,
there is often a “bleed over” effect (Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled et al., 1999). For example, criticisms
of ideas and suggestions may become emotional, and personality clashes may turn to criticisms
of substantive ideas. The .59 correlation between task and affective conflict found in the present
study is consistent with the .54 correlation found in a meta-analysis of intra-group conflict (De
Drue & Weingart, 2003). Therefore, the direction and magnitude of this relationship was
expected.
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In general, the present study found that higher conflict was related to lower performance.
Task and affective conflict were negatively related to performance measured as completeness of
the team’s rescue plan and performance measured as percentage of “good” or correct rescue plan
decisions. These relationships are consistent with recent meta-analytic findings which showed a
steady negative relationship between affective conflict and team outcomes including
performance (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2011). This meta-analysis also found that when the
association between task and affective conflict was strong within a study, and when the study
was conducted in a laboratory setting, task conflict was related to poorer performance. An earlier
meta-analysis similarly found a consistent negative relationship between task conflict and team
performance (De Drue & Weingart, 2003). Therefore, the findings in the present study regarding
the relationships between conflict and performance are consistent with those found in past
research.
A final relationship found in the present study was between schema congruence and
performance as compared to the optimal plan. Task schema congruence refers to the similarity of
teammates’ cognitive representations of task information which can be similar with respect to the
content and structure of that information (Rentsch & Hall, 1994). The more similarly teammates
mentally categorized and organized information related to the task, the closer their final rescue
plan came to the optimal plan developed by Navy SEALS. The finding that teams whose final
plans most closely approximated the optimal plan provided by subject experts is similar to other
findings that suggest experts’ schemas tend to converge and show greater similarity than do
schemas produced by novices (Rentsch, Heffner, & Duffy, 1994). It seems that in the present
study, when teams were able to produce a plan of near optimal “expert” quality, they also
developed task schemas that were similar. The relationship between schema congruence and
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performance is well-supported in the literature (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010). It has
been found that some of the mechanisms through which task schema similarity may facilitate
high performance is by increasing the teams’ ability to communicate about the task and
coordinate their actions to accomplish the task (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, and CannonBowers, 2000). The direct effects of cognitive similarity on team performance have also been
demonstrated empirically (Lim & Klein, 2006; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers, &
Salas, 2005) and across studies in a recent meta-analysis (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010).
In summary, although the present study did not find support for the hypothesized relationships,
other interesting relationships were uncovered that add to or support the literature on decision
making teams.
Contributions
The literature from several disparate areas of research was synthesized in the conceptual
framework shown in Figure 1. The framework offered a cross-disciplinary perspective and
advanced theoretical understanding of interrelatedness amongst the research in several subdisciplines of psychology including social, educational, counseling, and industrialorganizational, and several areas of management including managerial/organizational cognition,
organizational behavior, and human resources. The framework contributed to these literatures by
illustrating how cognitive style research can be extended beyond the individual level to the team
level. It also addressed the calls in the team diversity literature to move beyond demographic
diversity toward cognitive types of diversity (van Kippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Additionally,
the previously unrecognized role of perspective taking to team diversity and cognitive style was
integrated into the framework.
The present study contributes to theory and research by demonstrating appropriate multilevel research techniques. In this study a construct typically associated with the individual level
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of analysis was examined at the team level of analysis. According to Chan (1998) this represents
an elemental type of composition, one in which data from a lower level (individual cognitive
style) is used as a basis for a higher level construct (team cognitive style diversity). “In other
words, the higher level construct is of a collective or aggregate nature and is construed as some
form of combination of the lower level units” (Chan, 1998, p. 235). Multi-level data issues to
consider include the functional relationship between the levels, maintaining the integrity and
validity of the construct across levels, and the manner of aggregation (Chan, 1998). Five
composition models exist. Cognitive style diversity is best described in Chan’s typology by the
“dispersion” model. In the dispersion model it is the variance of scores at the lower level that is
of interest. This is in contrast to, for example, the “direct consensus” model where agreement at
the lower level is of interest and variance is viewed as error. When it is precisely this variance, or
diversity, in scores that is the value of interest, selecting the appropriate diversity
conceptualization is critical to proper operationalization. Harrison and Klein (2007) discussed
three configurations of group diversity and the appropriate statistic for aggregation in each
instance. For example, diversity of a categorical variable such as sex, is necessarily aggregated
differently than a continuous variable. Cognitive style diversity represents “separation” diversity
where team members vary in points across a continuum of scores. Separation diversity is best
indexed by a measure of distances between pairs of team members on the cognitive style
measure (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Appropriate indices include within team standard deviation
(as used in the present study) and average Euclidean distances. In summary, when a researcher is
interested in a phenomenon at the team level and that construct is most appropriately measured at
the individual level he or she must remain cognizant of maintaining congruence between the
measure and the aggregate as to not distort the construct across the levels. The present study
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contributed to future cognitive style diversity studies by outlining this process properly and
providing an exemplar for continuing this stream of research.
The limited findings from this study also contribute to research on teamwork, team
cognition, and virtual communication. Somewhat mixed evidence has accumulated in the
literature regarding team conflict. Convergence is found in support of affective conflict being
generally negative for team processes and outcomes (De Dreu & West, 2001). However, the role
of task conflict is less agreed-upon. Many researchers have posited that task conflict, especially
in a decision making scenario, would lead to improved performance due to a greater variety of
ideas exposed and the avoidance of negative processes like groupthink (De Drue & Weingart,
2003). The present study found that conflict, in both its forms, was related to lower team
performance and decision quality. It appears that in the specific context of an ad hoc decision
team, working virtually under time constraint, conflict may impede performance. Conversely,
this study found that cognitive similarity was related to improved performance and decision
quality that more closely approximated expert quality. This finding contributed to the growing
body of evidence supporting the connections between team cognition and performance
(DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010). If in fact the lack of anticipated findings in the present
study can be traced in part to the virtual nature of the communication medium, this may have
implications for virtual teamwork. Virtual contexts may change our capabilities to perspective
take and alter the nature of information sharing in decision making.
Limitations
As with any study, the present study had constraints and trade-offs which imposed
limitations. It was determined that, given the novel nature of the research, a laboratory setting
would allow for control over extraneous factors. Laboratory settings provide the ability to ensure
high levels of internal consistency through randomization, careful monitoring, and scripted
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procedures. This diminishes the effects of between-team differences in variables unrelated to the
study. However, for all of the advantages provided by a laboratory setting, there are constraints
associated with it. Locating adequate laboratory space and enticing participants are primary
concerns but these can be ameliorated somewhat easily in the educational and research-friendly
environments of a university setting. In the present study university students were selected as the
sample because the study variables were individual differences associated with all typical adults.
The use of university students has advantages and disadvantages. Two advantages include that
they are readily available, and they can be motivated to participate by external incentives. In the
present study, students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses were required to participate
in five hours of research to fulfill their course objectives. This provided motivation to participate
in the present study but also imposed the constraint that students would be unlikely to participate
in the study if more than five hours was required. Additionally, available participants were
limited to those enrolled in a given semester and this study competed with others for the fixed
pool of participants. Therefore unavoidably this study was limited to one hour’s worth of presession surveys and four-hours of laboratory time. A finite amount of individual and team data
could be collected in this time frame while allowing adequate time to complete the task.
Therefore, two limitations were the inherent constraints on time and amount of information that
could be collected from each participating team and individual. With more time, additional
variables might have been included that would have allowed for a wider ability to test or probe
the proposed relationships and to uncover unanticipated relationships.
The final sample consisted of 126 participants in three-person teams which yielded a
team sample size of 42. This sample size is consist with, and even surpasses, that of past teams
research (e.g., Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001). However, it still constrains statistical power to
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find relationships. This is underscored when considering the magnitude of some relationships
found in the present study that did not reach traditional levels of significance. Therefore, the
sample size restriction on statistical power was a limitation of this study. Some final limitations
concern measurement. Specifically, the self-report nature of several of the main variables and
issues with compounding unreliability are possible limitations. Self-report measurement is often
criticized for such characteristics as transparency, fakability, and lacking reliability (Chan,
2009). The pilot study conducted in preparation for the present study took these factors into
account and these results were considered in the selection of the self-report measures used.
Additionally, confirmatory factor analysis was conducted and showed the distinctness of the
constructs. None-the-less, alternative forms of measurement may also be appropriate, and
possibly more accurate, for the variables in this study. Additionally, it is not clear how
unreliability in the predictor, cognitive style, may be compounded when composed to the team
level using the standard deviation. In the present study, the Cognitive Style Index had a internal
consistency reliability estimate of .88. This is considered acceptable and even high reliability
(Nunnally & Bernstein). However, without additional evidence of its reliability such as test-retest
it may not be clear how small issues with unreliability are multiplied when combined using the
standard deviation.
Future Research
Given the present findings, the path is open for future studies to replicate and extend this
line of research. Several broad directions in which future research could proceed include
studying team cognitive style diversity with other task types or environmental contexts,
investigating its relationships with other process or outcome variables, and testing alternative
operationalizations or measurement techniques. The present study was conducted in a laboratory
setting with university students which may pose constraints on generalizing to working
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populations and environments. Therefore, future research should test the proposed relationships
in other teamwork contexts. One possible avenue is in the area of teams in new venture creation
with a focus on team cognition and decision making (West, 2007). Evidence has shown that
cognitive style diversity in these situations may affect strategic decisions. Cognitive style has
been associated with entrepreneurial self-efficacy and showed that rational and intuitive styles
contribute differently to the various functions (e.g., identifying opportunities, marshalling
resources) of the new venture process (Kickul et al., 2009). This may suggest that a
complementary blend of styles is necessary to cover all aspects of the process. Cognitive style
has also been associated with differences in the assessment of risk in decision making
(Henderson & Nutt, 1980) and in the quantity and quality of strategic business decisions (Hough
& ogilvie, 2005). Therefore, future research could investigate new venture teams’ cognitive style
diversity and their decision processes and outcomes.
Above it is noted that the present task and element of virtual communication may have
contributed to the unexpected lack of findings. Future research should consider closely the task
to communication medium fit. Although the task used in this study was highly realistic and
therefore generalizable outside of the laboratory, the additional of the virtual communication
medium may have been less realistic. The extent to which crisis decisions are made using virtual
communication is not known. Future research could incorporate “richer” mediums such as
teleconferencing which might more closely approximate how these types of decisions are made
in the real world. Similarly, the type of information presented in the task might have been too
foreign for undergraduates to grasp fully. For this reason, future research should consider the
sample to task fit and make alterations to maximize their compatibility. It might be possible to
use a sample with more military knowledge or a task more suited to the know base of
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undergraduates. Another avenue for future research is in testing the relationship between team
cognitive style diversity and alternative types of team cognition. Although a relationship between
cognitive style diversity and task schema congruence was not found in the present study, it is
possible that cognitive style diversity affects forms or content of team cognition other than
congruence of task information. Teams may develop many forms of cognition about their work
together and these forms of cognition can be about different types of content (Rentsch, Small, &
Hanges, 2008). For example, Mathieu et al. (2000) suggested that at least one other model of
cognitive content exists in addition to the task model and called it the teamwork model. They
explained that a teamwork model contains content about how the teammates interact, their roles
and responsibilities, and each other’s knowledge and skills. Rentsch et al. (2008) delineated
several different forms of cognition including perceptual, structured, and interpretive. Rentsch,
Delise, and Hutchison (2010) also discussed various forms of congruence such as similarity and
complementary forms. Additionally, other general categories of team cognition in exist.
Transactive memory (Austin, 2003) is a concept which is concerned with awareness of and
ability to retrieve each other’s expert knowledge. Cross-understanding is concerned with the
accuracy of teammate’s understanding of each other’s mental models (Huber & Lewis, 2010).
Therefore, simply because cognitive style diversity did not have a significant effect on task
schema congruence in the present study, does not mean it may not have effects on other types of
team cognition. Future research could investigate the relationship between cognitive style
diversity and other forms, content, and/or categories of team cognition.
Future research could also explore alternative measurement and operationalizations of the
present study variables. In the present study, diversity was measured as an individual difference
variable and aggregated to the team level. This technique measured diversity on the variable
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directly but did not assess the extent to which this diversity was experienced by the team.
Harrison and Klein (2000) suggested that perceived diversity may have more explanatory power
than actual diversity because perceptions of the social environment are often better predictors of
behavior than the objective environment. Others have similarly suggested that subjective
experience of diversity is more likely to explain other subjective experiences in teams such as
conflict than are more objective measures of diversity (Garcia-Prieto, Bellard, & Schneider,
2003). Therefore, measures could be created that assess the extent to which team members
perceive they have different cognitive styles. A measure could take the form of a multi-item
survey addressing the various parts of cognitive style such as information gathering, organizing,
and processing and be conducted in a round-robin fashion where each teammate rates their
perceived similarity in cognitive style to each other teammate. Different measurement techniques
could likewise be applied to the perspective taking construct. Some success has been found with
other-ratings (as opposed to self-ratings) of perspective taking such as the relationship Park and
Raile (2010) found between other-rated perspective taking and communication satisfaction.
Reimer (2001) measured perspective taking by assessing the accuracy of predictions about
another’s future actions. Therefore, future studies could assess perspective taking with different
measures such as other member ratings of perspective taking or an objective criteria of accuracy
about another’s perspective.
Conclusion
Cognitive style varies between individuals and can therefore create diversity within a
team. Because cognitive style has traditionally been studied at the individual level of analysis,
there was scant literature to draw upon in formulating expectations for the effects of cognitive
style diversity in teams. However, a large body of research has accumulated on a host of other
types of diversity in teams. As part of the present study, a framework in which cognitive style
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was embedded was developed to organize the team diversity literature. Using this framework as
a review of the literature on comparable types of diversity, hypotheses about cognitive diversity
effects were extrapolated. It was expected that diversity in team member cognitive styles would
affect task and affective conflict, the development of schema congruence, and performance.
Additionally, perspective taking was anticipated to moderate these relationships. Hypotheses
were tested in a laboratory study using three-person teams completing a simulated military
planning mission while using computers to communicate. None of the hypotheses were
supported. It was presumed that the study context differed too widely from that of past research
to be analogous. However, the present study highlighted the need to study cognitive style
diversity in other contexts, with different process or outcome variables, and/or with novel
measurement techniques to illuminate further these relationships. This study serves as an initial
step to what will hopefully be a productive line of future inquiry on cognitive style diversity in
teams.
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Rational and Intuitive Styles: Construct Validation of Four Measures
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The University of Tennessee

68
Rational and intuitive styles reflect differences in the way individuals gather and process
information (Hayes & Allinson, 1994; Ridding & Cheema, 1991; Robey & Taggart, 1981;
Sadler-Smith, 1998). Research suggests that these styles are differentially associated with
decisiveness (Hough & ogilvie, 2005), leader-member exchange relationships (Allinson,
Armstrong, & Hayes, 2001), team leader behavior (Armstrong & Priola, 2001), teaching style
(Evans, Harkins, & Young, 2008), entrepreneurship characteristics (Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa, &
Whitcanack, 2009), and risk assessment (Henderson & Nutt, 1980). To capitalize on
rational/intuitive style differences in practice and research, reliable and valid measures must be
used. Therefore, the purpose of present study was to compare the construct validity evidence for
measures of rational and intuitive style because the literature is lacking this evaluation.
Rational and Intuitive Styles
Rational style, also referred to as analytic style and linear style, is characterized by a
thorough search for facts and data, deliberate, logical information processing, and a focus on
problem details when making decisions. Hough and ogilvie (2005) wrote, “analytical
processes… [are] slow, rule-based, and depend on high-effort systematic reasoning” (p. 426).
Allison and Hayes (1996) stated that rational thinking "…refers to judgment based on mental
reasoning and a focus on detail" (p. 122). Vance, Groves, Paik, and Kindler (2007) defined
“linear thinking style as a preference for attending to external data and facts, and processing this
information through conscious logic and rational thinking…” (p. 170, italics in original).
Intuitive style, also referred to as holistic style and nonlinear style, has been described as
being based on internal feelings, a big-picture approach, little external data gathering, and fast,
intuition-based decision making. Hough and ogilvie (2005) wrote, “intuitive processes are fast,
associative, and use low-effort heuristics” (p. 426). Allinson and Hayes (1996) stated that
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intuitive "…refers to immediate judgment based on feelings and the adoption of a global
perspective" (p. 122). Vance et al. (2007) noted, “holistic in nature, intuition is often the result
of an automatic and unconscious assessment of the interrelated parts of a nonlinear system that
scans the integrated “big picture” to point to appropriate decisions and new directions, rather
than getting delayed and lost in the detailed analysis of a huge set of data” (p. 169).
Theory and empirical research support the notion that people have a consistent preference
for either a rational or intuitive style, but not both (Robey & Taggart, 1981). Therefore, we
expect positive relationships among rational style measures and positive relationships among
intuitive style measures, but negative relationships between rational and intuitive measures.
Rational measures evaluated in the present study were the Rational scale of the General
Decision-Making Style instrument (GDMS, Scott & Bruce, 1995), the Linear and External scales
of the Linear-NonLinear Thinking Styles Profile (LNTSP, Vance et al., 2007), and the Analytic
and Directive scales of the Decision Style Inventory (DSI, Rowe & Mason, 1987; See Table 1).
Intuitive measures evaluated were the Intuitive scale of the GDMS, the Nonlinear and Internal
scales of the LNTSP, and the Conceptual and Behavioral scales of the DSI. The Cognitive Style
Index (CSI, Allinson & Hayes, 1996), which is scored such that high scores reflect rational style
and low scores reflect intuitive style, was also included.
Construct Validity Evidence
Construct validity evidence includes indications of convergent relationships and expected
relationships with variables in the nomological net (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). In the present
study, convergent validity evidence was obtained by evaluating the intercorrelations among the
style measures (as described above).
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Evidence of predicted relationships with variables in the nomological net was also
evaluated. Specifically, rational style should be associated with conscientiousness and learning
goal orientation. Conscientiousness is characterized by organization, planning, carefulness, and
deliberation (Clark & Schroth, 2010; Perry, Witt, Penney, & Atwater, 2010). Learning goal
orientation is characterized by a desire to develop one’s competence through acquiring new skills
and mastering new situations (Vandewalle, 1997). Rational style should be positively related to
conscientiousness and learning goal orientation because rational style is characterized by a
thorough search for data, detail-oriented problem solving, and careful, planned decision making,
characteristics that highly conscientious and learning goal oriented individuals would exhibit.
Intuitive style should be related to extraversion and self-monitoring. Extraversion is
described as engagement in one’s surrounding environment (Bolton, Becker, & Barber, 2010).
Self-monitoring refers to the degree to which people regulate, through self-observation, the way
they present themselves to others (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Snyder, 1974). Intuitive style
should be positively related to extraversion and self-monitoring because individuals with an
intuitive style also use a big picture approach to problem solving, including an understanding of
the external environment.
Rational and intuitive style should not be significantly related to agreeableness, openness
to experience, emotional stability, perspective taking, self-esteem, social desirability, or
psychological collectivism. Agreeableness reflects a desire for social harmony and cooperation
with others (Bolton et al., 2010). Openness to experience is characterized by imagination,
sensitivity, and a willingness to try new experiences (McCrae & Costa, 1983). Emotional
stability relates to the tendency to experience emotional swings or negative emotions (Perry et
al., 2010). Perspective taking is the inclination to “spontaneously adopt the point of view of
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others” (Davis, 1980, p.114). Self-esteem is a conscious global self-evaluation of one’s worth
(Campbell, Eisner, & Riggs, 2010). Social desirability is a measure of an individuals’ tendency
to respond in a socially desirable manner (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), a response bias that
should not exist for a valid style measure. Psychological collectivism refers to the extent to
which individuals emphasize relationships within and feel responsibility towards an in-group
(Jackson, Colquitt, Wesson, & Zapata-Phelan, 2006). These variables should be unrelated to
rational and intuitive style because they do not directly relate to information gathering,
organization, or processing.
Method
Participants
Participants were 119 students from a large public university who received course credit
for participation. Participants were 42% female, 83% Caucasian, 74% upperclassman, 56%
currently employed, and had a mean age of 20.9 years.
Procedure
Participants were given two packets of measures that included informed consent
information. They were instructed to complete both packets at different times to avoid fatigue
and to return the completed measures within seven days. Participants were debriefed and
awarded credit upon packet return. Measures were ordered within each packet to vary construct
and response format.
Measures
Rational and intuitive style. Four measures were used to assess rational and intuitive
style. The CSI contained 38 true/uncertain/false items that were scored 0 (intuitive), 1
(uncertain), or 2 (rational) points, yielding a possible 0-76 range. Internal consistency reliability
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estimates have ranged from .84 to .92 (Allinson & Hayes, 1996). The LNTSP contained a 5-item
Linear/Nonlinear scale and a 8-item External/Internal scale, each consisting of pairs of stimuli
containing one Linear (or External) option and one Nonlinear (or Internal) option. Respondents
distributed three points across each pair of items, which resulted in the Linear (External) and
Nonlinear (Internal) responses being correlated -1.00. Therefore, scores for only the Linear and
External scales were used in the analyses, with scores ranging from 0-15 and 0-24, respectively.
Internal consistency reliability estimates have ranged from .70 to .78 for Linear and from .84 to
.92 for External (Vance et al., 2007). GDMS contained a Rational scale (four items) and an
Intuitive scale (five items) with a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) response scale.
Internal consistency reliability estimates have ranged from .77 to .85 for Rational and from .78 to
.84 for Intuitive (Scott & Bruce, 1995). DSI contained 20 questions, each with four responses,
one response representing each style. Respondents allocated 1, 2, 4, or 8 points to each option to
indicate their likelihood of acting according to the represented style (Analytic, Conceptual,
Directive, or Behavioral). Split-half reliability estimates have ranged from .5 to .7 (Rowe &
Mason, 1987). Internal consistency reliability estimates for these measures in the present study
can be found in Table 2.
Nomological net variables. Learning goal orientation was assessed with five items
using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) response scale. Internal consistency reliability
estimates have ranged from .88 to .91 (Vandewalle, 1997). The items were adapted to academic
situations. Conscientiousness and extraversion were each assessed with eight items using 1 (very
inaccurate) to 7 (very accurate) response scale. Internal consistency reliability estimates have
ranged from .83 to .86 and .83 to .85, respectively (Saucier, 1994). Self-monitoring was assessed
with the Self-Monitoring Scale using 18 true/false items with a reported internal consistency
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reliability estimate of .70 (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985). Internal consistency reliability estimates
for these measures in the present study can be found in Table 3.
Discriminant nomological net variables. Agreeableness, openness to experience, and
emotional stability were each assessed with eight items using a 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very
accurate) response scale. Internal consistency reliability estimates have ranged from .81 to .85,
.78, and .76 to .78, respectively (Saucier, 1994). Perspective taking was assessed with seven
items from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index using a 1 (does not describe me well) to 5
(describes me very well) response scale. Internal consistency reliability estimates have ranged
from .71 to .77 (Davis, 1980). Self-esteem was assessed with the 10-item Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1985) using a 1 (doesn’t describe me in the slightest) to 9 (describes
me perfectly) response scale. The reported internal consistency reliability estimate was .83
(Campbell, Eisner, & Riggs, 2010). Social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was assessed
with 32 items using a true/false response scale. The reported internal consistency reliability
estimate was .75 (Holden & Passey, 2010). Five dimensions of psychological collectivism
regarding in-groups (preference, reliance, concern, acceptance of norms, and goal priority) were
assessed with three items each using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) response scale.
Reported internal consistency reliability estimates were .86, .81, .90, .90, and .86, respectively
for the subscales (Jackson et al., 2006). Internal consistency reliability estimates for these
measures in the present study can be found in Table 4. Demographic information regarding age,
gender, grade point average (GPA), class rank, and work experience was also assessed.
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Results
Descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 2-4. Partial correlations were examined in
cases where demographic variables correlated significantly with study variables. All correlations
reported in parentheses below were significant at p < .05.
Convergent Validity Evidence
Evidence of convergent validity was obtained by examining the intercorrelations among
the cognitive style assessments. See Table 2. We expected rational measures to correlate
positively with one another, intuitive measures to correlate positively with one another, and
rational measures to correlate negatively with intuitive measures.
Results for CSI, Linear, External, Rational, and Intuitive were strong. CSI correlated
positively with Linear (.45), External (.49), and Rational (.55), and negatively with Intuitive (.46). Similarly, Linear correlated positively with External (.55) and Rational (.41), and
negatively with Intuitive (-.60). External correlated positively with Rational (.49) and negatively
with Intuitive (-.55). Rational and Intuitive were negatively correlated (-.38).
The DSI scales (Analytic, Conceptual, Directive, and Behavioral) were expected to
correlate significantly with one another and with the other five scales. Analytic correlated
negatively with Conceptual and Behavioral (-.34 and -.58, respectively), but not positively with
Directive. Conceptual correlated negatively with Directive (-.34), but not positively with
Behavioral. Directive and Behavioral were negatively correlated (-.41). Results for the Analytic
scale were strong. Analytic correlated positively with CSI (.40), Linear (.43), External (.41), and
Rational (.45), and negatively with Intuitive (-.33). Results for the Conceptual and Behavioral
scales were mixed. Conceptual correlated negatively with CSI (-.24) and Rational (-.20), but not
negatively with Linear or External or positively with Intuitive. Behavioral correlated negatively

75
with External (-.21) and Rational (-.21), but not positively with Intuitive or negatively with CSI
and Linear. Results for the Directive scale were poor. We hypothesized that Directive would
correlate positively with CSI, Linear, External, and Rational and negatively with Intuitive.
However, it correlated positively with Intuitive (.33).
Nomological Net Evidence
We hypothesized that rational style would be positively related to conscientiousness and
learning goal orientation and negatively related to extraversion and self-monitoring, with
relationships in the opposite direction for intuitive style. See Table 3.
Evidence for Linear was strong. It correlated positively with conscientiousness (.31) and
learning orientation (.30) and negatively with extraversion (-.21) and self-monitoring (-.34).
Evidence for the CSI, External, Rational, and Analytic scales was moderate. CSI,
External, Rational, and Analytic correlated positively with conscientiousness (.49, .29, .33, and
.30, respectively) and negatively with self-monitoring (-.52, -.46, -.36, and -.30, respectively).
Rational and Analytic were positively correlated with learning orientation (.22 and .24,
respectively). CSI and External were negatively correlated with extraversion (-.35 and -.28.
respectively).
Evidence for Intuitive was modest. It correlated positively with extraversion (.41) and
self-monitoring (.38) but was not correlated with conscientiousness and learning orientation.
Evidence for Conceptual, Directive, and Behavioral was poor. There were no significant
correlations for Conceptual and Behavioral, and Directive was unexpectedly positively
correlated with self-monitoring (.31).
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Discriminant Nomological Net Evidence
It was hypothesized that style would be unrelated to agreeableness, openness to
experience, emotional stability, perspective taking, self-esteem, social desirability, and the five
dimensions of in-group collectivism (preference, reliance, concern, norm acceptance, and goal
priority). See Table 4.
Evidence for CSI and Analytic was strong. Both were unrelated to agreeableness,
openness to experience, emotional stability, perspective taking, self-esteem, social desirability,
and the collectivism dimensions.
Evidence for Linear, External, Rational, and Directive was moderately strong. All four
scales were unrelated to agreeableness, openness to experience, emotional stability, perspective
taking, self-esteem, and three collectivism dimensions (reliance, concern, and norm acceptance).
However, Linear and Directive were correlated with social desirability (.27 and -.33,
respectively). External and Rational each correlated with one of the collectivism scales –
External with preference (-.29) and Rational with goal priority (-.30).
Evidence for Intuitive and Conceptual was moderate. Both were unrelated to
agreeableness, openness to experience, perspective taking, self-esteem, and three of the
collectivism dimensions (reliance, norm acceptance, and goal priority). However, Intuitive was
correlated with social desirability (-.25) and the collectivism dimension preference (.27) and
Conceptual was correlated with emotional stability (.35) and the collectivism dimension concern
(-.22).
Evidence for Behavioral was modest. It was unrelated to agreeableness, emotional
stability, self-esteem, and four collectivism dimensions (preference, concern, norm acceptance,
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and goal priority). However, it was correlated with openness to experience (-.22), perspective
taking (.22), social desirability (.30), and the collectivism dimension reliance (.25).
Discussion
Evaluation of Each Measure
Useful measures of rational and intuitive styles should be reliable, correlated with
predicted nomological net variables, uncorrelated with discriminant variables, free of social
desirability bias, uncorrelated with demographics variables, and should have a reasonable length,
response format, and an identifiable context for use. Below, we offer recommendations for each
measure based on these characteristics. A summary is also presented in Table 5. All measures
except the DSI had acceptable internal consistency reliability estimates.
The validity evidence for the CSI was strong. It demonstrated expected relationships
with nomological net variables and discriminant variables, and was not significantly correlated
with social desirability. With respect to demographics, in the present sample it was positively
correlated with GPA, possibly because typical academic assessments may favor the careful and
deliberate nature of rational style, leading to higher grades. The CSI is moderate in length. The
minimal missing data may be attributable to the response format. Rows of identical answer
bubbles may have led respondents to overlook some items. Minor format changes (e.g., lines,
increased spaces between items) may alleviate this problem. CSI items are situated within a
broad context with many work-related items. The CSI would be useful for assessing rational and
intuitive style in general circumstances and managerial contexts.
The validity evidence for the LNTSP was also strong. It demonstrated expected
relationships with nomological net and discriminant variables, although the External scale was
negatively correlated with social desirability. The Linear and External scales were correlated
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with GPA but not with other demographic variables. The LNTSP has only 13-items. However,
approximately 10% percent of cases were missing because respondents’ ratings violated the
instructions (pair ratings did not sum to 3), indicating possible problems with the response
format or the instructions. The LNTSP is the only measure evaluated in the present study that
differentiated information gathering (External/Internal) from processing (Linear/Nonlinear).
Therefore, the LNTSP would be appropriate for use in instances when both facets of style are of
interest.
The validity evidence for the GDMS was fairly strong. The Rational and Intuitive scales
generally correlated as expected with nomological net and discriminant variables. However,
fewer predicted relationships were confirmed with the Intuitive scale and it was correlated with
social desirability. Additionally, the Rational scale unexpectedly correlated negatively with class
rank but, was unrelated to other demographic variables. The GDMS has relatively few items and
had the least missing data (1% or fewer missing items and cases). The GDMS items were
couched in the context of “important” decisions. The GDMS might be considered to assess style
when a lengthier measure is impractical, but it would require controlling for social desirability.
The empirical evidence related to the DSI is relatively weak. All scales except Analytic
showed poor construct validity evidence, Directive and Behavioral correlated with social
desirability, and Behavioral correlated with gender. With an average scale reliability of less than
.42 in the present study, the internal consistency reliability estimates were unacceptable. The
DSI is lengthy because using any scale requires responses to 80 stimuli. Additionally, 17% of
the cases were unusable because respondents’ ratings violated the instructions (did not use 1, 2,
4, and 8 for their responses to each item). The items were work-related and were designed for
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use with managers. Although the content of the DSI is commendable, given the empirical
results, the DSI requires additional development before its use could be recommended.
Limitations and Future Research
The use of students in the present study may limit the generalizability of the results.
However, 56% of participants held a job at the time of the study and 70% of those with jobs
worked 20 hours per week or more. Thus, participants had substantial job experience and were
representative of some employed populations. However, future research should evaluate these
measures using samples from different populations (e.g., draw from various professions,
experience levels, work contexts), which may reveal how the measures vary in their
interpretation or applicability. Evaluation of style in various populations might also reveal
relationships between style and other organizationally-relevant outcomes. Perhaps rational and
intuitive styles lend themselves differently to various tasks. Researchers have found that
turnover, for example, was higher when a misfit between style and job demands existed (Chan,
1996). Other outcomes such as job satisfaction and performance might also be influenced by the
interaction of style and work contexts. Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies could provide
insight into the stability or malleability of style. For example, if experience with problemsolving and decision making scenarios leads managers to feel more comfortable relying on
global, intuition-based information processing, then intuitive style may be related to managerial
experience. These are but a few possible fruitful paths for future style research.
The variables in this present study were measured using self-reports. Self-report data is
often criticized as being fakeable, lacking reliability, and as producing invalid estimates of
relationships with other variables (Chan, 2009). However, several aspects of the present study
mitigate these concerns. The anonymity of the data and non-evaluative nature of the study
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should have encouraged truthful responses (Chan, 2009). The various response formats of the
measures required participants’ attention and may have reduced the likelihood of such response
biases as central tendency. Furthermore, the constructs in the present study do not lend
themselves well to objective measures. They are most appropriately assessed using self-report
methods, because they would not likely be more reliably captured using another measurement
technique (Chan, 2009). Additional criterion variables such as peer ratings, time-to-decision, or
schema structure could serve as alternative assessment approaches in future research.
With respect to the style measures, self-report is the preferred method of assessing them
due to the nature of the constructs and the inherent difficulties associated with the other methods.
For example, it is cumbersome and expensive to assess the brain waves of many individuals with
an EEG (Robey & Taggart, 1981). Similarly, timed assessments or measures that must be sent
for proprietary scoring are cumbersome to administer (Robey & Taggart, 1981). The
contribution of the present study was to evaluate several measures commonly used in I-O and
related literature. However, future research should extend measurement of rational and intuitive
styles to behaviorally-oriented assessments.
Conclusion
The present study provides an evaluation of the construct validity evidence of measures
of rational and intuitive styles. Convergent, nomological net, and discriminant validity results
showed the most support for the CSI, followed by the LNTSP and GDMS, and poor support for
the DSI. Reliability evidence, relationships with social desirability, and respondent difficulties
with response format followed a similar pattern. Future research should continue to examine
measures of rational and intuitive styles and their influences on organizationally-relevant
variables.

81
References
Allinson, C. W., & Hayes, J. (1996). The cognitive style index: A measure of intuition-analysis
for organizational research. Journal of Management Studies, 33(1), 119-135.
Allinson, C. W., Armstrong, S. J., & Hayes, J. (2001). The effects of cognitive style on leadermember exchange: A study of manager-subordinate dyads. Journal of Occupational and
Organizational Psychology, 74, 201-220.
Armstrong, S. J., & Priola, V. (2001). Individual differences in cognitive style and their effects
on task and social orientations of self-managed work teams. Small Group Research,
32(3), 283-312.
Bolton, L. R., Becker, L. K., & Barber, L. K. (2010). Big Five trait predictors of differential
counterproductive work behavior dimensions. Personality and Individual Differences,
49(5), 537-541.
Campbell, R. L., Eisner, S., & Riggs, N. (2010). Sources of self-esteem: From theory to
measurement and back again. New Ideas in Psychology, 28(3), 338-349.
Chan, D. (1996). Cognitive misfit of problem-solving style at work: A facet of personorganization fit. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 68(3), 194207.
Chan, D. (2009). So why ask me? Are self-report data really that bad? In C. E. Lance, & R. J.
Vandenberg (Eds.), Statistical and methodological myths and urban legends: Doctrine,
verity and fable in the organizational and social sciences (pp. 309-336). New York:
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
Clark, M. H., & Schroth, C. A. (2010). Examining relationships between academic motivation
and personality among college students. Learning and Individual Differences, 20(1), 1924.

82
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24(4). 349-354.
Evans, C., Harkins, M. J., & Young, J. D. (2008). Exploring teaching styles and cognitive styles:
Evidence from school teachers in Canada. North American Journal of Psychology, 10(3),
567-582.
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113126.
Gangestad, S., & Snyder, M. (1985). “To carve nature at its joints": On the existence of discrete
classes in personality. Psychological Review, 92(3), 317-349.
Hayes, J., & Allinson, C. W. (1994). Cognitive style and its relevance for management practice.
British Journal of Management, 5, 53-71.
Henderson, J. C., & Nutt, P. C. (1980). The influence of decision style on decision making
behavior. Management Science, 26(4), 371-386.
Hough, J. R., & ogilvie, d. (2005). An empirical test of cognitive style and strategic decision
outcomes. Journal of Management Studies, 42(2), 417-448.
Holden, R. R., & Passey, J. (2010). Socially desirable responding in personality assessment: Not
necessarily faking and not necessarily substance. Personality and Individual Differences,
49(5), 446-450.
Jackson, C. L., Colquitt, J. A., Wesson, M. J., & Zapata-Phelan, C. P. (2006). Psychological
collectivism: A measurement validation and linkage to group member performance.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(4), 884-899.

83
Kickul, J., Gundry, L. K., Barbosa, S. D., & Whitcanack, L. (2009). Intuitition versus analysis?
Testing differential models of cognitive style on entrepreneurial self-efficacy and new
venture creation process. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 33(2), 439-453.
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1983). Joint factors in self-reports and ratings: Neuroticism,
extraversion and openness to experience. Personality and Individual Differences, 4(3),
245-255.
Perry, S. J., Witt, L. A., Penney, L. M., & Atwater, L. (2010). The downside of goal-focused
leadership: The role of personality in subordinate exhaustion. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 95(6), 1145-1153.
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). Psychometric theory (3rd edition). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Riding, R., & Cheema, I. (1991). Cognitive styles – an overview and integration. Educational
Psychology, 11(3/4), 193- 226.
Robey, D., & Taggart, W. (1981). Measuring managers' minds: The assessment of style in
human information processing. Academy of Management Review, 6(3), 375-383.
Rosenberg, M. (1985). Self-concept and psychological well-being in adolescence. In R. L. Leahy
(Ed.), The development of the self (pp. 205-246). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Rowe, A. J., & Mason, R. (1987). Managing with style: A guide to understanding, assessing, and
improving decision making. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Sacier, G. (1994). Mini-markers: A brief version of Goldberg’s unipolar Big-Five markers.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 63(3), 506-516.
Sadler-Smith, E. (1998). Cognitive style: Some human resource implications for managers.
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9(1), 185-202.

84
Scott, S. G., & Bruce, R. A. (1995). Decision-making style: The development of a new measure.
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 55(5), 818-831.
Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 30(4), 526-537.
Vandewalle, D. (1997). Development and validation of a work domain goal orientation
instrument. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 57, 995-1015.
Vance, C. M., Groves, K. S., Paik, Y., & Kindler, H. (2007). Understanding and measuring
linear-nonlinear thinking style for enhanced management education and professional
practice. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 6(2), 167-185.

85
Table 1
Cognitive Style Measures Categorization and Scoring.

Measure

Higher Scores Indicate

Lower Scores Indicate

More rational
processing style

Less rational
processing style

More intuitive
processing style

Less intuitive
processing style

More rational
processing style

More intuitive
processing style

Rational Style
LNTSP: Linear Scale
LNTSP: External scale
GDMS: Rational scale
DSI: Analytic scale
DSI: Directive scale
Intuitive Style
LNTSP: Nonlinear scale
LNTSP: Internal scale
GDMS: Intuitive scale
DSI: Conceptual scale
DSI: Behavioral scale
Rational and Intuitive Style
CSI
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Table 2
Correlations Among Cognitive Style Measures
Variables

M

SD

rxx

1

1. CSI

43.46

11.59

.82

-

7.67

2.65

.67

.45**a

-

3. LNTSP: external

15.28

3.35

.76

.49**

.55**a

4. GDMS: rational

15.35

2.45

.80

.55**

.41**a

.49**

5. GDMS: intuitive

17.32

3.20

.82

-.46**a

-.60**a

-.55**a

6. DSI: analytic

79.71

15.89

.50

.40**

.43**a

7. DSI: conceptual

76.53

12.72

.24

-.24*

8. DSI: directive

73.97

13.49

.32

9. DSI: behavioral

69.80

16.54

.61

2. LNTSP: linear

Note. n ranges from 94-121
a

Controlled for GPA

b
c

Controlled for Age and Class

Controlled for Age, Class, and GPA

* p < .05, ** p < .01; two-tailed tests.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

-.38**a

-

.41**

.45**

-.33**a

-.20a

-.10

-.20*

.15a

-.34**

-

-.14b

-.20c

-.08b

-.01b

.33**c

-.10b

-.34**b

-

.02

-.08a

-.21*

-.21*

-.10a

-.58**

-.14

-.41**b

-

-
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Table 3
Nomological Net Correlations

Variables

Learning
Conscientious Orientation

SelfExtraversion Monitoring

CSI

.49**b

.06d

-.35**

-.52**e

LNTSP: linear

.31**b

.30**d

-.21*a

-.34**f

LNTSP: external

.29**b

.16d

-.28**

-.46**e

GDMS: rational

.33**b

.22*d

-.11

-.36**e

GDMS: intuitive

-.06b

-.18d

.41**a

.38**f

DSI: analytic

.30**b

.24**d

-.14

-.30**e

DSI: conceptual

-.10b

.02d

-.01

-.02e

DSI: directive

-.12d

-.09d

.07c

.31**g

DSI: behavioral

-.13b

-.15d

.01

-.10e

rxx

.82

.80

.82

.72

M

41.87

26.34

39.23

10.50

SD

7.59

5.81

8.33

3.54

Note. n ranges from 97-120
a
Controlled for GPA
b
Controlled for GPA and Age
c
Controlled for Age and Class
d
Controlled for Age, Class, and GPA
* p < .05, ** p < .01; one-tailed tests.

e

Controlled for Gender
Controlled for GPA and Gender
g
Controlled for Age, Class, and Gender
f
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Table 4
Discriminant Nomological Net Correlations

Variables

Emotional
Agreeable Openness Stability

Perspective SelfTaking
Esteem

Social
Desire

CSI

.07

.18

-.20e

.12

LNTSP: linear

.09a

-.03a

.17f

.18a

.23a

.27*a

-.17

.15

LNTSP: external

-.16

.06

-.11e

.01

.03

.16

GDMS: rational

.03

.18

-.18e

.10

.03

.12

GDMS: intuitive

-.04a

-.00a

.05f

-.23a

-.02a

-.25*a

DSI: analytic

.06

.20

-.10e

-.00

-.10

.05

DSI: conceptual

.00

.12

.35**e

.07

.14

-.05

DSI: directive

-.17c

-.01c

-.22g

-.16c

.17c

-.33**c

DSI: behavioral

.14

-.22*

.05e

.22*

rxx

.83

.73

.81

.77

.83

.82

M

44.63

42.20

37.27

17.53

32.22

15.29

SD

7.15

6.21

8.17

4.98

4.55

5.64

-.03

Note. n ranges from 96-121.
a

e

b

f

Controlled for GPA
Controlled for GPA and Age
c
Controlled for Age and Class
d
Controlled for Age, Class, and GPA

* p < .05, ** p < .01; two-tailed tests.

Controlled for Gender
Controlled for GPA and Gender
g
Controlled for Age, Class, and Gender

.30**
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Table 4
Discriminant Nomological Net Correlations (Continued)
Variables

Collectivism
Prefer
Reliance

Concern

Norms

Goals

.05

-.04

-.18e

f

CSI

-.12

-.22

LNTSP: linear

.10a

-.14f

-.00a

.10a

.16f

LNTSP: external

-.29**

-.24f

-.09

-.08

.02e

GDMS: rational

-.06

-.22f

.06

-.04

-.30*e

GDMS: intuitive

.27*a

.23f

.13a

.00a

-.04f

DSI: analytic

-.07

-.22f

.17

-.05

.04e

DSI: conceptual

-.07

.13f

-.22*

-.13

-.02e

DSI: directive

-.01c

-.17g

-.02c

.03c

.09g

DSI: behavioral

.13

.25*f

.03

.16

-.02e

rxx

.81

.95

.85

.86

.68

M

8.87

8.64

12.09

10.79

9.36

SD

3.08

2.80

1.95

1.76

2.47

Note. n ranges from 96-121.
a

e

b

f

Controlled for GPA
Controlled for GPA and Age
c
Controlled for Age and Class
d
Controlled for Age, Class, and GPA

* p < .05, ** p < .01; two-tailed tests.

Controlled for Gender
Controlled for GPA and Gender
g
Controlled for Age, Class, and Gender
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Table 5
Summary of Results

Percent Missing

Percent of Expected
Relationships Confirmed

Scale

Number
of Items

Items

Cases1

Nomological Net Discriminant

CSI

38

<1

6

75

100

LNTSP: linear

5

7

8

100

91

LNTSP: external

8

5

9

75

91

GDMS: rational

4

<1

1

75

91

GDMS: intuitive

5

<1

1

50

82

DSI: analytic

20

4

17

75

100

DSI: conceptual

20

4

17

0

82

DSI: directive

20

4

17

0

91

DSI: behavioral

20

4

17

0

64

1

Because no missing data were replaced and scale scores were sums of item scores, a missing
item in a scale resulted in a missing case for that scale
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Appendix B
People differ in the way they think about problems. Below are 38 statements designed to identify
your own approach. If you believe that a statement is true about you, answer T. If you believe
that it is false about you, answer F. If you are uncertain whether it is true or false, answer ?. This
is not a test of your ability, and there are no right or wrong answers. Simply choose the one
response which comes closest to your own opinion. Work quickly, giving your first reaction in
each case, and make sure that you respond to every statement.
Indicate your answer by completely filling in the appropriate oval opposite the statement:
T True

? Uncertain

F False
T

?

F

In my experience, rational thought is the only realistic basis for making
decisions.

0

0

0

2.

To solve a problem, I have to study each part of it in detail.

0

0

0

3.

I am most effective when my work involves a clear sequence of tasks to
be performed.

0

0

0

I have difficulty working with people who ‘dive in at the deep end’
without considering the finer aspects of the problem.

0

0

0

5.

I am careful to follow rules and regulations at work.

0

0

0

6.

I avoid taking a course of action if the odds are against its success.

0

0

0

7.

I am inclined to scan through reports rather than read them in detail.

0

0

0

8.

My understanding of a problem tends to come more from thorough
analysis than flashes of insight.

0

0

0

I try to keep to a regular routine in my work.

0

0

0

The kind of work I like best is that which requires a logical,
step-by-step approach.

0

0

0

11.

I rarely make ‘off the top of the head’ decisions.

0

0

0

12.

I prefer chaotic action to orderly inaction.

0

0

0

13.

Given enough time, I would consider every situation from all angles.

0

0

0

1.

4.

9.
10.
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14.

To be successful in my work, I find that it is important to avoid hurting
other people’s feelings.

0

0

0

The best way for me to understand a problem is to break it down into
its constituent parts.

0

0

0

I find that to adopt a careful, analytical approach to making decisions
takes too long.

0

0

0

17.

I make most progress when I take calculated risks.

0

0

0

18.

I find that it is possible to be too organised when performing certain
kinds of task.

0

0

0

19.

I always pay attention to detail before I reach a conclusion.

0

0

0

20.

I make many of my decisions on the basis of intuition.

0

0

0

21.

My philosophy is that it is better to be safe than risk being sorry.

0

0

0

22.

When making a decision, I take my time and thoroughly consider all
relevant factors.

0

0

0

23.

I get on best with quiet, thoughtful people.

0

0

0

24.

I would rather that my life was unpredictable than that it followed
a regular pattern.

0

0

0

25.

Most people regard me as a logical thinker.

0

0

0

26.

To fully understand the facts I need a good theory.

0

0

0

27.

I work best with people who are spontaneous.

0

0

0

28.

I find detailed, methodical work satisfying.

0

0

0

29.

My approach to solving a problem is to focus on one part at a time.

0

0

0

30.

I am constantly on the lookout for new experiences.

0

0

0

31.

In meetings, I have more to say than most.

0

0

0

32.

My ‘gut feeling’ is just as good a basis for decision making as careful
analysis.

0

0

0

I am the kind of person who casts caution to the wind.

0

0

0

15.

16.

33.
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34.

I make decisions and get on with things rather than analyse every
last detail.

0

0

0

35.

I am always prepared to take a gamble.

0

0

0

36.

Formal plans are more of a hindrance than a help in my work.

0

0

0

37.

I am more at home with ideas rather than facts and figures.

0

0

0

38.

I find that ‘too much analysis results in paralysis’.

0

0

0

(Citation: Allinson, C. W., & Hayes, J. (1996). The cognitive style index: A measure of intuitionanalysis for organizational research. Journal of Management Studies, 33(1), 119-135; Higher
scores represent more rational style; the following items are reverse scored: 7, 12, 16, 17, 18, 20,
24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38).
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Appendix C

The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For
each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on the scale: A,
B, C, D, E, (where A = Does not describe me well and E = Describes me very well). When you
have decided on your answer, select the appropriate letter. READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY
BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can.

A
does not
describe
me well

B

Answer Scale:
C

D

E
describes me
very well

1. ____ I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy’s" point of view.
2. ____ I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
3. ____ I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from
their perspective.
4. ____ If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other
people’s arguments.
5. ____ I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
6. ____ When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
7. ____ Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their
place.

(Citation: Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113-126;
Higher scores indicate more perspective taking; the following items are reverse scored: 1 and 4).
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Appendix D
Please answer the following questions about the extent to which differences in opinion and
disagreements occur within the team.
1 – Not at all
2–
3–
4–
5 – Very much

1. How frequently are there conflicts about ideas in the team?
2. How much are personality conflicts evident in the team?
3. How much tension is there among members in the team?
4. How often do people in the team disagree about opinions regarding the work being done?
5. How much friction is there among members in the team?
6. How much emotional conflict is there among members in the team?
7. To what extent are there differences of opinion in the team?
8. How much conflict about the work you do is there in the team?
9. To what extent do people take the arguments in the team personally?
10. How much jealousy or rivalry is there among the members in the team?

(Citation: Hinds, P. J., & Mortensen, M. (2005). Understanding conflict in geographically
distributed teams: The moderating effects of shared identity, shared context, and spontaneous
communication. Organization Science, 16(3), 290-307; Task conflict is represented by the
following items: 1, 4, 7, and 8 where higher score equal more conflict; Affective conflict is
represented by the following items: 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10 where higher scores equal more conflict
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Table 1. Variable inter-correlations
1. CS Diversitya
2. CS Meana, c
3. Affective Conflict
4. Task Conflict
5. Schema Congruenceb
6. Perspective Takinga
7. Performance: Percent Good
8. Performance: Optimal
9. Performance: Completeness
n = 41
a
n = 42
b
n = 40
c
Higher scores are more
rational

x
11.04
43.58
7.93
9.17
.79
17.44
73.75
4.71
11.10

s.d.
6.79
7.14
2.12
1.87
.13
3.24
11.53
4.76
2.18

1
-.14
-.04
-.07
.02
.07
.08
.11
.14

2

3

-.05
-.36*
-.13
.18
.05
-.14
-.02

4

5

6

7

-.04
-.13
-.39*
-.18
-.37*

-.24
.16
.29*
.13

-.25
-.40*
-.04

8

9

.59*
.08
-.08
-.23
-.15
-.32*

.76*
.74*

.36*

Table 2. Hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity on task conflict controlling for the mean effect of cognitive style
Predictors

B

SE B

β

t

Mean Cognitive Style

-.09

.04

-.36

-2.41

Step 1
Step 2
Mean Cognitive Style
Cognitive Style Diversity

-.10
-.03

.04
.04

-.37
-.12

-2.47
-.76

r
.36

R2
.13

∆R2
.13

Sig.
.02

.38

.14

.01

.45
.02
.45

-
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Table 3. Moderated hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on task conflict
Predictors

B

SE B

β

t

Cognitive Style Diversity
Perspective Taking

-.02
-.07

.04
.09

-.06
-.12

-.37
-.75

Cognitive Style Diversity
Perspective Taking
CSD x PT

-.02
-.27
.02

.04
.21
.02

-.08
-.47
.39

-.47
-1.31
1.01

Step 1

Step 2

r
.14

R2
.02

∆R2
.02

.22

.05

.03

Sig.
.69
.71
.46
.28
.64
.20
.28

Table 4. Moderated hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on affective conflict
Predictors

B

SE B

β

t

Cognitive Style Diversity
Perspective Taking

-.01
-.05

.05
.11

-.03
-.08

-.17
-.48

Cognitive Style Diversity
Perspective Taking
CSD x PT

-.02
-.57
.05

.05
.22
.02

-.07
-.87
.89

-.43
-2.63
2.6

Step 1

Step 2

r
.09

R2
.01

∆R2
.01

Sig.
.87
.87

.40

.16

.16

.01
.67
.01
.01

Table 5. Moderated hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on schema congruence
Predictors

B

SE B

β

t

Cognitive Style Diversity
Perspective Taking

.00
-.01

.00
.01

.04
-.24

.22
-.15

Cognitive Style Diversity
Perspective Taking
CSD x PT

.00
.01
.00

.00
.01
.00

.05
.19
-.46

.32
.54
-1.36

Step 1

Step 2

r
.24

R2
.06

∆R2
.06

.32

.10

.05

Sig.
.33
.83
.14
.18
.75
.59
.18
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Type of Diversity
More
Affective
Conflict

Surface
Level
Social
Categorization

Increased
Difficulty
Developing
Schema
Congruence

Task
Relevant

Task
Irrelevant

Informational/
Decision Making

More Task
Conflict

Deep
Level

More
Affective
Conflict

Increased Difficulty
Developing Schema
Congruence
Figure 1. The relationship between types of diversity, conflict, and the development of schema
congruence
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10
9

Affective Conflict

8
7
6
5

Low Perspective
Taking

4

High Perspective
Taking

3
2
1
Low Cognitive Style
Diversity

High Cognitive Style
Diversity

Figure 2. Interaction of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on affective conflict
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